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Abstract: 
 
This dissertation seeks firstly to expose the fundamental difficulties associated 
with liberal attempts at conflict mediation, and subsequently to consider how 
these can be overcome through the development of post-liberalism and 
agonism.  As highlighted by events such as the July 7th London bombings and 
the 2011 UK riots, values in pluralist society Ð such as those held by Marxist; 
feminist; religious; and ethnic groups - are often incompatible and 
incommensurable with one another.  The dissertation aims to unearth liberal 
universalism as an aggravator of these pluralist tensions, increasing the 
potential for fundamentalism and the outbreak of conflict.  It will argue that 
claims about the neutrality and universality of its principles, alongside its 
employment of a fixed public-private distinction, renders liberal universalism 
an oppressive theory that suppresses politics. Subsequent to forming this 
normative critique of liberal universalism, the dissertation will then examine 
post-liberal attempts to abandon neutrality and universality in favour of radical 
choice and contingency.  Post-liberalism aims to provide a less oppressive 
alternative and to revive politics.  However, I will suggest that post-liberal 
aspirations toward radical choice and contingency can neither overcome 
oppression, nor revive politics, unless it renegotiates the fixed public-private 
divide.  The dissertation argues that agonism fills this gap by reworking the 
public-private distinction.  It illustrates how agonism employs a similar 
rejection of liberal neutrality and universality, endorsing the same radical 
choice and contingency advocated by post-liberalism.  The dissertation then 
considers how agonism builds on this through notions of agonistic respect and 
critical responsiveness, both of which allow it to renegotiate the public-private 
distinction.  I will then discuss how renegotiation surmounts both the 
oppression of pluralist groups and the suppression of politics, encouraging 
citizens to engage publicly in the continual contestation of existing values.  In 
 3 
so doing, the paper aspires to demonstrate how agonism builds on post-liberal 
advancements to offer us a less oppressive, more diverse alternative, 
rendering it a favourable conflict mediator to liberal universalism.   
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Introduction 
Mediating Pluralist Conflict
 7 
ÔPluralism emerges as a possibility to pursue rather than the certain 
effect of determinate conditions.  To the extent that it is attained, it 
remains a fragile achievement to be cherished rather than an outcome 
to take for granted.Õ  (William E. Connolly, 2005) 
 
This dissertation seeks to explore the fundamental difficulties associated with 
liberal universalist attempts at conflict mediation and to suggest that both 
post-liberalism and agonism aspire to overcome these.  Aims at conflict 
mediation occur within the context of a multicultural, pluralist Britain whereby 
a range of actors, including gay rights advocates; pro-choice abortion 
campaigners; religious groups and ethnic communities, endorse numerous 
value systems.  Although a key component of British society, the pluralist 
nature of these values often results in incompatible or incommensurable 
conflict.  Richard Bellamy defines pluralism as the existence of an array of 
moral and non-moral values that Ômay prove either inherently or contingently 
incompatible.Õ1  He affirms that the incompatibilities that arise from pluralism 
Ôunsettle the theory and practice of politicsÕ2, thereby posing a challenge to 
attempts at conflict mediation.  This challenge is evident in this summerÕs UK 
riots, whereby thousands of British citizens carried out a series of lootings and 
disturbances on other members of their own communities.  This pluralist 
conflict not only resulted in economic devastation, but also had damaging 
social consequences, fragmenting communities and increasing the potential for 
further violent pluralist conflict as a result.   
 
In addition to the threat posed by social fragmentation, pluralist society is also 
endangered by fundamentalism.  William E. Connolly describes 
fundamentalism as Ôa general imperative to assert an absolute, singular 
                                                
1 Bellamy, Richard, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise, (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 3. 
2 Ibid, p. 1. 
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ground of authority; [and] to ground your own identity and allegiances in this 
unquestionable source.Õ3  The danger of relentlessly imposing a system of 
values, expressing unwavering loyalty to it, is underlined by instances of 
domestic and international terrorism such as the July 7th London bombings 
and the September 11th attacks.  During these events, Islamic fundamentalists 
sought to assert their values as an absolute ground of authority, 
unquestioningly rooting their identities and allegiances in Islamic extremism, 
which led to the indiscriminate killing of thousands of civilians.  In addition to 
causing initial casualties, pluralist fundamentalism can also lead to a cycle of 
violence, as demonstrated by the reactions that followed September 11th.  In 
March this year, a Christian fundamentalist named Terry Jones burnt 200 
Qurans in retaliation of the terrorist attacks, which in turn provoked protesters 
in Afghanistan to attack the UN Assistance Mission, killing over 30 people and 
injuring over 150.4  It is thereby evident how often the fundamentalism that 
arises from pluralist tensions, not only leads directly to conflict, but also 
initiates a relentless cycle of violence.  It is thus evident that diversity in 
pluralist society carries with it threats of social fragmentation and 
fundamentalism, both of which increase the potential for violent outbursts of 
conflict.  The initial violence of such outbursts can then aggravate social 
fragmentation and pluralist tensions, leading to further instances of 
aggression.   
 
Prior to the Enlightenment period, British society suffered a long history of 
religious violence as a direct result of the fundamentalist imposition of 
Christianity.5  Liberalism, with its primary aspirations of freedom and equality, 
                                                
3 Connolly, William E., The Ethos of Pluralization, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1995), 
p.105. 
4 CNN Wire Staff, Protests Continue in Afghanistan against Quran burning. [online] CNN 2011 
[viewed 17 August].  Available from: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/05/afghanistan.protests/index.html 
5 Palmer, Robert R., The Age of the Democratic Revolution, (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 
1964). 
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arose as a response to such violence and currently remains the prevalent 
Western ideology within both society and the academy.6  This field of 
contemporary political philosophy seeks to consider liberal values with respect 
to their multicultural, pluralist context.  The dissertation will analyse liberal-
universalist, post-liberal, and agonistic attempts at pluralist conflict mediation 
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of these three endeavours.   
 
In analysing the efficacy of the three attempts at conflict mediation, my 
dissertation will employ a normative methodology, continually asking Ôwhat is 
the best way to liveÉ[and] concerned with thinking about the world not only 
as it is but also as we might think it ought to be.Õ7  Yet this normative 
methodology distinguishes itself from that advocated by Rawlsian analytical 
philosophy, which seeks to show liberal theories as rationally demonstrable.  
Rather, my dissertation applies an adaptation of the term coined by Richard 
Rorty as a Geistegeschichte, which Ôworks at the level of problematicsÉ  It 
wants to give plausibility to a certain image of philosophy, rather than to give 
plausibility to a particular solution of a given philosophical problem.'8  The 
dissertation thereby aspires to analyse the fundamental difficulties and merits 
of the three theories, rather than concerning itself with specific details.  In so 
doing, it rejects the application of empirical methods, whereby Ôthose who 
simply use established concepts to get to the facts of political life, those who 
act unreflectively within the confines of established concepts, actually have the 
perceptions and modes of conduct available to them limited in subtle and 
undetected ways.Õ9  Instead, it acknowledges such limitations, seeking instead, 
to challenge the established concepts and their confines by adopting a post-
structuralist position.  This position promotes the Foucauldian assumption in 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Marsh, David, and Gerry Stoker. Theory and Methods in Political Science. (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), p. 156. 
8 Rorty, Richard, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner. Philosophy in History: Essays on the 
Historiography of Philosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 57. 
9 Connolly, William E, The Terms of Political Discourse, (Oxford: M. Robertson, 1983), p. 1. 
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which, Ôour language, and all the assumptions and self-conceptions that it 
contains, constitutes a structure that is independent of individual decisions 
and which shapes our outlooks and interactions.Õ10  The dominant structures 
Ômake claims to universal truth Ð truth about human nature, about how the 
world works, about what makes sense and what doesnÕt.  No claims of this 
kind can be proven by reference to some ultimate criteria and so constitute 
exercises in power, imposing conceptions and self-conceptions upon 
persons.Õ11  The dissertation seeks to challenge this imposition of the concepts 
held by the most powerful doctrines by Ôdeliberately prob[ing] the conventions 
governing those concepts.Õ12  However, its methodology diverges from 
genealogy as it does not require an exploration of the history of political 
thought to expose these Ôdiscursive contexts, suppressed in the course of our 
often chaotic and fragmentary discursive history.Õ13  Instead, it involves a 
comparison of the three theories within their contemporary pluralist setting, 
aspiring to provide a conceptual insight into internal concepts and their 
potential exclusions.  The methodology also combines its highly theoretical 
approach with a practical element, whereby hypothetical examples of value 
conflict both support and substantialise the theory.  These examples include 
conflict between liberals and communities with regards to marriages requiring 
conversion to a particular community; pro-choice and pro-life advocates 
concerning abortion and euthanasia; liberals and Muslims regarding the public 
wearing of burkha; and, finally, liberals and gay rights campaigners with 
respect to gay marriage.  
 
Chapter one constitutes an exploration of liberal universalist attempts at 
conflict mediation.  Liberal universalism seeks to reduce conflict by promoting 
freedom and equality by aspiring to create an impartial public sphere, and 
                                                
10 Marsh and Stoker, p. 170. 
11 Ibid, p. 172. 
12 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, p. 3. 
13 Marsh and Stoker, p. 171. 
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aiming to contain pluralist conflict to the non-public and private spheres.  The 
label Ôliberal universalism,Õ encompassing thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin, 
Bruce Ackerman and John Rawls, will be employed in order to distinguish this 
field of liberalism from the various other forms that exist.  In particular, the 
term seeks to distinguish thinkers like John Stuart Mill, who refer to liberalism 
as one conception of the good,14 from those liberal universalists who perceive 
liberal principles to constitute a Ôfreestanding view.Õ15  The first chapter will 
primarily engage with RawlsÕ A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, which 
are presented as exemplars of liberal universalist thought.  The decision to 
utilise RawlsÕ liberalism as a sample of the field can be explained by the 
enormous impact his work, in particular these two texts, has had.  Brian 
Anderson affirms this in the assertion that Ôit would be only a slight 
exaggeration to say that since the 1970s, universities in the English-speaking 
world (and increasingly elsewhere) have transformed the teaching of political 
philosophy into an extended commentary on Rawls's thought.Õ16  Indeed, it is 
essential to note that all liberal universalists diverge on certain issues and that 
RawlsÕ work cannot be used as an identical model for the rest of the field.  
Similarly, it is of great significance that liberal universalism is not neatly 
separable from other versions of liberalism and some aspects may thus 
overlap with other strands of liberal thought.  Yet RawlsÕ focus on state 
neutrality, a fixed public-private divide and emphasis on both toleration and 
individual freedom allow us to employ his work as a symbolic of the liberal 
universalist field.   
 
This first chapter aspires to demonstrate how RawlsÕ attempts to mediate 
pluralist conflict by limiting its entrance into the public sphere.  In so doing, he 
                                                
14 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty and the Subjection of Women, (London: Penguin Group, 2006). 
15 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Belknap of Harvard University 
Press, 1999), p. 10. 
16 Anderson, Brian, The Antipolitical Philosophy of John Rawls.  [online].  Public Interest, 2003 
[viewed 14 July].  Available from:  http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/the-
antipolitical-philosophy-of-john-rawls 
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firstly constructs a political conception Ôdistinct from the various conceptions of 
justiceÕ17 in A Theory of Justice and, subsequently, an overlapping consensus 
which Ôtries, then, to present an account of these values as those of a special 
domain Ð the political Ð and hence as a freestanding viewÕ18 in Political 
Liberalism.  Both of these theories seek to attach objectivity and neutrality to 
their principles in an aspiration of remaining impartial toward pluralist conflict.  
This neutrality is supplemented by a universalistic element in both texts:  A 
Theory of Justice refers to the liberal values chosen in the Original Position as 
an agreement that Ôwe can viewÉfrom the standpoint of one person selected 
at random.Õ19  Rawls modifies such universalism in Political Liberalism by 
limiting its applicability to the confines of a democratic society in order to 
adapt to new pluralist concerns.  However, the universal authority of liberal 
principles is still evident within these democratic societies.  This universalism 
is implicit in the boundaries that Rawls draws on society through the labels of 
the ÔrationalÕ and the Ôreasonable.Õ20  In seeking to attach neutrality and 
universality to its principles, liberal universalism aspires to provide fairness, 
equality and stability by distancing itself from conflicting comprehensive 
doctrines.  Yet, the dissertation will argue that these attempts at neutrality fail 
because of our inability to separate ourselves from our attachments.  I will 
employ post-structuralist analyses to expose how claims to neutrality and 
universality are reliant upon the exclusions of minority groups, ethnic 
communities and religions.   Then, I will explore how upholding such pretences 
to neutrality and universality prevent citizens from contesting and challenging 
liberal values, rendering liberal universalism an oppressive theory.  I will 
subsequently argue that the use of terms such as ÔfreedomÕ and ÔtolerationÕ 
constitute an attempt to reaffirm liberal values, which further oppresses 
minority groups.  Finally, the dissertation will undertake an exploration of the 
                                                
17 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 5. 
18 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism, (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 140. 
19 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 120. 
20 Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
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liberal universalist public-private separation, which discriminates against those 
who disagree with the dominant norms in society.  The exclusions and 
assimilation brought about by the fixed public-private separation are apparent 
in the controversial issue of abortion, which is both a public and private issue.  
Thus, attempts at relegating issues like abortion to the private sphere, are 
exclusionary since they fail to reflect the fluidity between the public and 
private domains.  Moreover, the research will suggest that the above 
combination of liberal universalist attempts at reaffirming liberal values whilst 
suppressing pluralism exposes the fundamental difficulties intrinsic to liberal 
universalism.  It will thus be illustrated how fundamentalism may be 
aggravated, rather than mediated, through liberal universalism because of its 
oppression of minorities and its exclusion of those that do not honour liberal 
principles. 
 
Chapter two comprises an account of how post-liberal conflict mediation 
moves beyond liberal universalist attempts.  Post-liberalism seeks to reduce 
conflict by endorsing liberal values, whilst rejecting claims that their nature is 
either neutral or rationally demonstrable.  By terming the work of Joseph Raz, 
Isaiah Berlin, Richard Rorty and John Gray Ôpost-liberalism,Õ I aspire to 
distinguish it from the preceding field of liberal universalism.  The term, 
borrowed from GrayÕs own work, encapsulates the field of theorists that come 
after the liberal universalist field which was influenced by the neutrality and 
impartiality endorsed by Rawls.  The employment of a range of GrayÕs work as 
a sample of post-liberal literature is necessary as a result of two elements.  
Primarily, Gray engages with the work of Raz, Berlin and Rorty, grouping them 
himself into the field of Ôpost-liberalism.Õ  Additionally, his work has had 
significant impact on key agonist thinkers such as William Connolly, Chantal 
Mouffe and David Owen.  As in the first section of the dissertation, it is 
important to note that the work of the thinkers is not interchangeable and that 
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GrayÕs work provides only a sample of post-liberalism rather than an identical 
replica.  Further, it does not exist within a vacuum, and resemblances can be 
found between post-liberalism and both liberal universalism and agonism.  
However, it is the unanimous rejection of liberal universalist neutrality and 
impartiality that allows GrayÕs thought to ÔrepresentÕ post-liberalism. 
 
This second chapter aims to demonstrate how post-liberalism seeks to 
overcome the oppressive and fragmentary elements of liberal universalism by 
rejecting its focus on neutrality and impartiality.  The research will firstly 
discuss the three inevitabilities of pluralist conflict intrinsic to BerlinÕs 
conception of value pluralism.  I will then illustrate how Gray develops this in 
his three forms of incommensurability, which renders us powerless to measure 
the relative worth of conflicting values in pluralist society.  These three notions 
of incommensurability will then be utilised to emphasise the inability of 
liberalism to escape such incommensurability.  I will also defend GrayÕs work 
against charges that assert that the acceptance of inevitable value 
incommensurability necessarily renders political decisions relativist, in which 
all moral standards are abolished.  Following its exposition of 
incommensurability, the research will explore the consequent post-liberal 
abandonment of neutral or universal forms of liberalism.  It will discuss GrayÕs 
rejection of liberal universalist doctrines based on fixed hierarchies of values, 
and his alternative proposal for a more political system founded on radical 
choice rather than rational, insisting upon the necessary contingency of 
decision making.  Finally, I will endorse GrayÕs rejection of neutrality and 
universality in favour of a more political, radical and contingent system but 
contest that, in order to fulfil these aims, it requires the reworking of the 
public-private separation.      
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The third and final chapter of the dissertation aspires to show how agonism 
expands on post-liberal developments of liberal universalism in an attempt at 
further overcoming oppression and fragmentation.  Agonism aspires to reduce 
pluralist conflict by reworking the public-private divide into a more ambiguous 
distinction, in which focus upon contestation and the contingency of decision-
making aspire to overcome oppression and revive politics.  The field of 
agonism, comprised of thinkers such as Aletta Norval, Chantal Mouffe and 
William Connolly, both problematises the permanence of the public-private 
divide and insists upon the contestability and contingency of dominant values, 
thus separating itself from liberalism.  The thinker for this section, William 
Connolly, has been chosen as a sample of the agonistic tradition on the basis 
that his work - which is largely perceived to have had huge impact throughout 
the field in North America and Europe for the past two decades.  He also 
directly engages with the work of both Rawls and Gray, rendering him a 
relevant thinker for my research.  It is of great importance that there are 
various strands within agonism, and that ConnollyÕs work is only symbolic of 
its principal ideas.  Likewise, agonism does not exist in isolation to 
contemporary political theory and it is significant that its views often parallel 
those outside of the field; such as its resonance with GrayÕs work.  However, it 
is agonismÕs insistence on the necessity of ensuring both the renegotiation of 
the public-private divide and the contestability and contingency of dominant 
values that groups agonist thinkers together. 
 
This third chapter aspires to show how agonism utilises, and expands upon, 
post-liberal thinking by outlining the key elements of a renegotiated public-
private divide.  This renegotiation seeks to offer a less oppressive, less 
fragmentary alternative to conflict mediation than liberal universalism.  The 
section will commence by demonstrating how ConnollyÕs rejection of the 
conventional notion of pluralism, employed by Rawls, seeks to overcome the 
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oppression and fragmentation of minority groups in society.  The dissertation 
will then explore how oppression and fragmentation is intensified by the 
manner in which conventional pluralism negates diversity into Otherness.  The 
research will subsequently utilise ConnollyÕs understanding of identity, 
demonstrating the relationality and necessary interdependence element of 
citizens to one another, in order to evoke the oppression caused by the fixed 
public-private separation.  In so doing, I will subsequently analyse agonistic 
respect and critical responsiveness in order to explore the necessary 
conditions of public contestation for allowing minority citizens to overcome 
oppression.  ConnollyÕs acknowledgement of the risk involved in such a public 
contestation of beliefs and faiths will be discussed and defended against 
charges of cultural relativism.  I will assert that ConnollyÕs renegotiation of the 
public-private divide is a noble attempt at overcoming oppression and 
exclusion in favour of a radical politics of contingency.  However, my final 
contention is that, ConnollyÕs ethos is overly optimistic in the context of 
fundamentalist conflict, such as the July 7th bombings.  The research will thus 
discuss the possibility of supplementing ConnollyÕs theory with both 
motivational narratives, which provoke actors into engagement and 
institutions to complement the ethos that he seeks to generate. 
 
The dissertation will then seek to analyse the three forms of conflict mediation 
contextualised by a pluralist society rife with diverse, conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines.  From a post-structuralist standpoint, the first 
chapter will seek to expose how false pretences to neutrality and universality, 
along with a fixed public-private distinction, render liberal universalism an 
oppressive and fragmentary theory which can aggravate fundamentalist 
conflict.  The second chapter will then aspire to demonstrate how post-liberal 
thinkers endeavour to overcome such oppression and fragmentation by 
rejecting claims to neutrality, universality and rationalism, perceiving 
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liberalism as one doctrine amongst many.  Yet, the research will conclude that 
its failure to rethink the public-private divide prevents post-liberalism from 
applying its radical choice and contingency.  The dissertation thus concludes 
that it cannot overcome the oppression and fragmentation of liberal 
universalism unless it reworks the public-private separation.  Finally, the third 
chapter will aim to illustrate the agonistic rethinking of the public-private 
divide and how its insistence upon public contestation, the contestability of 
norms and the contingency of decision-making overcome the oppression and 
fragmentation in the manner that post-liberalism aspires to do so.  However, it 
will be contended that in order to fulfil its aspirations in practice, ConnollyÕs 
agonism requires the aid of both a motivational narrative and institutions. 
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Chapter One 
The Liberal Universalism of John Rawls 
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ÔBy avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion and 
philosophyÕs profoundest controversies so as to have some hope of uncovering 
a basis of a stable overlapping consensus.Õ  
(John Rawls, 2005) 
 
Through consideration of the work of John Rawls, this section of the 
dissertation aspires to expose the difficulties inherent within liberal 
universalism.  Firstly, it demonstrates how Rawls acknowledges the 
inevitability of pluralist conflict, seeking to mediate this through the provision 
of a separate political conception and an overlapping consensus.  Rawls aims 
to distinguish this political conception from comprehensive doctrines, aspiring 
to fairness, equality and stability through the endorsement of neutrality.  Yet, 
I will argue that attempts at neutrality are flawed since our identities are not 
distinguishable from our attachments.  Then I will explore how the false 
insistence on neutrality imposes an oppressive universalism on citizens, 
rendering them unable to contest the liberal hegemony.  Furthermore, the 
chapter will argue that RawlÕs blindness to his universalism is a form of 
fundamentalism, which suppresses cultural diversity.  I will consider the ways 
in which principles of freedom and toleration are utilised primarily to reaffirm 
liberal values and are thus not fully extended to minority groups.  Finally, I will 
discuss how the public-private distinction can exclude and oppress citizens.  
Moreover, I will suggest that the combination of reaffirming liberal values 
alongside the suppression of pluralism could render liberal universalism a 
theory, with devastating effects on pluralist conflict.       
 
John Rawls provides a noble attempt at mediating conflict in A Theory of 
Justice, in which he acknowledges that Ôsociety is typically marked by a 
 20 
conflict as well as by an identity of interests,Õ21 and subsequently seeks to 
reduce such disagreement.  He reasons that, as a result of social diversity, 
Ôwhat is just and unjust is usually in dispute,Õ22 and, consequently, society 
cannot be based on a conception of justice endorsed by any one 
comprehensive doctrine.  Rawls explains that rather than founding society on 
a particular one of these doctrines, Ôit seems natural to think of the conception 
of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice.Õ23  Peter Mandle 
affirms that what distinguishes the liberal conception of justice from those 
diverse private conceptions is its focus Ôon the basic structure of society.  We 
are not aiming to establish a comprehensive account of morality.Õ24  RawlsÕ 
work is thereby an example of a deontological approach, which refuses to 
concern itself with an account of morality.  Instead, it emphasises the 
importance of creating Ôa characteristic set of principles for assigning basic 
rights and duties,Õ25 in an attempt at avoiding the value conflicts existent 
between the diverse private conceptions.   
 
In deciding upon which principles this separate political conception should be 
founded upon, Rawls employs both the Original Position and the Veil of 
Ignorance.  The original position is a hypothetical situation in which all 
knowledge is restricted from the individual regarding, firstly, information about 
their society, and, secondly, their status within that society.  Samuel Freeman 
explains the importance of restricting knowledge of the society, stating that it 
aims toward an impartial conception whose Ôprinciples of justice are not 
contoured to the conditions of any particular social situation or designed to 
promote or especially favour any particular conception of the good.Õ26  In 
                                                
21 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.4. 
22 Ibid, p. 5. 
23 Ibid, p. 5. 
24 Mandle, Jon, RawlsÕs A Theory of Justice: an introduction, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 45. 
25 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 5. 
26 Freeman, Samuel, Rawls, (London:  Routledge, 2007), p. 13. 
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simultaneously preventing the progression and regression of particular sectors 
of society, RawlsÕ liberalism comprises an attempt at providing Ôa framework 
or an arena for a fair agreement.Õ27  In placing a veil of ignorance over 
knowledge of the society then, RawlsÕ theory aspires toward an impartial, fair 
and equal means of choosing the principles of justice.   
 
Along with restricting the individualÕs knowledge of his society, the veil of 
ignorance also ensures that the individual is ignorant of his own class, social 
status and the attributes he possesses.  Rawls explains that in so doing, Ôone 
excludes the knowledge of these contingencies which sets men at odds and 
allows them to be guided by their prejudices.Õ28  Consequently, the liberal 
universalist decision to restrict the knowledge of the individual with regards to 
his own position also aims to provide a fair and equal foundation in which Ôno 
one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome 
of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.Õ29  Thus, since 
the citizen is unaware of his socio-economic position, the veil of ignorance 
assumes that he could imagine himself as the most disadvantaged member, 
encouraging principles to be chosen that even the most deprived could 
endorse.  In RawlsÕ theory, this is essential to forming the basis of society 
because Ôonly a set of principles that protects everyoneÕs fundamental 
interests will be acceptable to everyone.Õ30  Mandle explains this, in asserting 
that Ôif we can identify the principles that [those in the original position] would 
find to be the most acceptable, then we have good reason to believe that 
those principles would be fair to everyone, and this is exactly what we want.Õ31  
In this manner, liberal universalism is said to prevent the most advantaged 
sectors exploiting society, and thereby reduces the inequalities that lead to 
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social fragmentation.  Therefore, both components of the veil of ignorance - 
restricting knowledge of both the status of society and the status of the 
individual within that society - aspire toward a fair and equal basis on which to 
found the principles of justice.   
 
Thus, both knowledge restrictions imposed by the veil of ignorance aim to 
allow a fair and equal society which neither advances nor limits the interests 
of any sector of society.  John Gray explains that, in order to achieve this 
desired fairness and equality, the principle of neutrality is essential to liberal 
universalist theories such as A Theory of Justice.  He explains that Ôthe 
paradigmatic liberal concernÉis equalityÉwhich dictates Ð for governments, at 
least neutrality with regard to their various conceptions of the good life.Õ32  
Rawls also acknowledges this in A Theory of Justice, in which he refers to its 
conditions as Ôembody[ing] those of objectivity.Õ33  He shows that, in aiming 
toward fairness and equality, neutrality requires Ôus to consider the choice of 
principles unencumbered by the singularities of the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves.Õ34  Hence, in order to achieve a neutral framework that aims to 
promote equality and fairness, Rawls employs methods such as the original 
positionÕs veil of ignorance to Ôprevent us from shaping our moral view to 
accord with our own particular attachments and interests.Õ35  Thus, it is the 
focus on neutrality in liberal universalist theories that mirrors liberal 
aspirations of equality by attempting to prevent the promotion of a single set 
of interests.   
  
According to Rawls, Ôwithout these limitations on knowledge the bargaining 
problem of the original position would be hopelessly complicated.Õ36  This 
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echoes his previous assertion that social diversity renders clashes over justice 
inevitable.  Thus, employment of neutrality not only seeks fairness and 
equality, but also aspires to reduce conflict.  It does so by displacing diverse 
individuals from their personal belief systems, which inevitably contain 
elements that are either incompatible or incommensurable with those of 
others.  Rawls asserts that, whereas conflict is inevitable between conflicting 
belief systems, Ôonce knowledge is excluded, the requirement of unanimity is 
not out of place.Õ37  He explains that Ôone consequence of trying to be 
objective, of attempting to frame our moral conceptions and judgments from a 
shared point of view, is that we are more likely to reach agreement.Õ38  Thus 
according to liberal universalists, it is precisely this neutrality that Ôpermit[s] 
essential understandings to be reached,Õ39 and consensus to be formed.  
RawlsÕ A Theory of Justice considers this consensus to be universally 
applicable, asserting that Ôwe can view the agreement in the original position 
from the standpoint of one person selected at random.Õ40  Thus, theories like 
RawlsÕ attempt to provide neutrality as a gateway to fairness and equality.  
This offers a noble attempt at conflict reduction through the development of a 
universally applicable consensus on the principles of justice.   
 
In addition to aspiring toward equality and conflict reduction, Rawls aims to 
allow the existence of Ôa stable and just societyÕ41 through his agreed political 
conception.  The existence of diversity and conflict between differing private 
conceptions of the good leads to RawlsÕ aforementioned assumption that no 
single private conception of justice can be endorsed by all of society.  The 
affirmation of one such doctrine would thus be exclusionary and fail to 
encourage social unity, leading to fragmentation and instability.  Additionally, 
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this private conception might even clash directly with the conception to which 
another is loyal, thereby failing to provide social unity and stability, increasing 
the potential for both fragmentation and conflict as a result.  Quite contrarily, 
Rawls states that the Ôprinciples [of his political conception of justice] are to be 
universal in application,Õ42 and are to be perceived as distinct from those 
private ones.  This ensures that Ôthose who hold different conceptions of 
justice can still agreeÕ43 to its implementation.  Hence, in aspiring to create a 
conception that can be endorsed by the whole of society, irrespective of their 
individual conceptions of justice, Rawls seeks to Ôestablish the bonds of civic 
friendship,Õ44 thereby aiming to both eliminate social fragmentation and 
promote social unity.  Aspiring to overcome the exclusionary nature of one 
particular private conception, RawlsÕ agreed political conception thus strives to 
maintain impartiality in order to be universally applicable.  This universality 
constitutes an attempt at surmounting the threat of social fragmentation by 
attempting to enhance stability through social unity. 
 
Rawls attempts, through the device of the original position, to provide a fair 
and equal framework upon which to replace conflict with stability. He assumes 
that two principles of justice would be chosen.  Reflecting the liberal 
prioritisation of fairness and equality, Ôthe two principles impose a kind of 
egalitarianism Ð even if not strict equality Ð on the design of the basic 
structure.Õ45  The first principle of justice states that Ôeach person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties for others.Õ46  The aim of this is to create a 
political structure that guarantees the basic liberties, defined in A Theory of 
Justice as political freedom, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of 
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conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person, the right to hold 
personal property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure.47  Echoing 
aims of equality advocated by the veil of ignorance, the first principle Ôsimply 
requires that certain sorts of rules, those defining basic liberties, apply to 
everyone equally and that they allow the most extensive liberty compatible 
with a like liberty for all.Õ48  Hence, the first principle protects against 
inequalities within the basic liberties, and Rawls confirms that these liberties 
Ôcan be limited and compromised only when they conflict with other basic 
liberties.Õ49   Consistent with the original positionÕs emphasis on equality then, 
the first principle seeks to provide equal freedom to all, aspiring towards a fair 
political structure of society. 
 
The second principle of justice, the Ôdifference principle,Õ applies to Ôthe 
institutions that regulate social and economic inequalities.Õ50  Rawls states that 
Ôwhile the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to 
everyoneÕs advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and 
responsibility must be accessible to all.Õ51  Thus, the second principle attempts 
to prevent inequalities both by ensuring that inequality only exists if it 
advantages all sectors of society, and by opening positions of responsibility to 
everyone.  It is important to note that Ôthe baseline from which we assess 
prospective gains and losses is one of equality, not the inequalities that might 
currently exist in an actual society.  If there currently are unjust inequalities, 
the difference principle may very well sanction losses to the wealthy in order 
to achieve gains for the poor.Õ52  The difference principle thereby rearranges 
social and economic inequalities to ensure that the least advantaged are 
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benefited most greatly.  In only allowing social inequalities that favour the less 
fortunate, RawlsÕ theory continues to aspire toward equality.53   
 
The application of RawlsÕ principles of justice employs the same neutrality and 
impartiality that is emphasised during their choosing.  Rawls asserts that Ôthe 
acceptance of the two principles constitutes an understanding to discard as 
irrelevant as a matter of social justice much of the information and many of 
the complications of everyday life.Õ54  Thus, just as the original position 
requires distance between the individual and his private beliefs, Rawls calls for 
a similar separation of the application of the two principles of justice and many 
of the issues alongside which they are employed.  This thereby comprises a 
further attempt at fairness and equality, ensuring that no particular sector of 
society is either advantaged or disadvantaged. 
 
The notion of distancing political principles from varying private conceptions is 
both continued and expanded in RawlsÕ Political Liberalism through the 
founding of an overlapping consensus, which seeks to mediate disagreements.  
Political Liberalism acknowledges the emergence of pluralism and 
multiculturalism, which bear witness to new challenges in conflict prevention.  
It asserts that Ômodern democratic society is characterized not simply by a 
pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but 
by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.Õ55  
Consequently, Rawls explains that Political Liberalism refers to the society in A 
Theory of Justice Ôonce it is adjusted to the fact of reasonable pluralism.Õ56  
Following the emergence of such pluralism, Political Liberalism thus claims to 
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abandon the universality of A Theory of Justice, focusing instead upon the 
model of Ôa well-ordered liberal societyÕ57 and Ôthe idea of citizenship in a 
democratic regime.Õ58 
 
Political LiberalismÕs task then, is to create an overlapping consensus for a 
society in which Ôcitizens are deeply divided by conflicting and even 
incommensurable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.Õ59  Just as 
Rawls claims that the political conception outlined in A Theory of Justice is 
Ôdistinct from the various conceptions of justice,Õ60 and consequently neutral 
with regards to private morality, he also states that the overlapping consensus 
Ôlooks for an idea of rational advantage...that is independent of any particular 
comprehensive doctrine.Õ61  Political Liberalism mirrors A Theory of JusticeÕs 
earlier assumption that conflict is inevitable between diverse private 
conceptions, explaining that, Ôcomprehensive philosophical and moral 
doctrines likewise cannot be endorsed by citizens generally.Õ62  In a similar 
manner to A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism seeks to distance its 
overlapping consensus from these comprehensive doctrines in order that it Ôis 
not viewed as incompatible with basic religious, philosophical, and moral 
values.Õ63  According to Rawls, this encourages social unity by providing 
Ôcommon ground Ð or if one prefers, neutral ground Ð given the fact of 
pluralism.Õ64  Therefore, the overlapping consensus is supposed to be inclusive 
of all citizens, ensuring fairness and equality, and thereby encouraging social 
unity.  In addition to endeavours of fairness, equality and unity, the 
overlapping consensus also reflects the necessity for stability emphasised in A 
Theory of Justice.  Rawls states that Ôstability is possible when the doctrines 
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making up the consensus are affirmed by societyÕs politically active citizens 
and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizensÕ 
essential interests.Õ65  Consequently, the overlapping consensus continues to 
seek fairness and equality through impartiality; whilst promoting unity and 
stability through commonalities.  In promoting fairness, equality, unity and 
stability, RawlsÕ notion of overlapping consensus aims to prevent 
fragmentation in order to minimise pluralist conflict.   
 
The overlapping consensus constitutes a further attempt at replacing conflict 
with stability by, firstly aiming to maintain impartiality toward comprehensive 
doctrines and, subsequently attempting to relegate moral concerns to the 
private realm.  Rawls clarifies that in order Ôto maintain impartiality between 
comprehensive doctrines, [the overlapping consensus] does not specifically 
address the moral topics on which those doctrines divide.Õ66  The decision not 
to address specific questions of morality is explicated in his affirmation that 
Ôby avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion and 
philosophyÕs profoundest controversies.Õ67  Political LiberalismÕs silence on 
these issues thus develops the assumption in A Theory of Justice that states 
that the very diversion away from Ôa comprehensive account of moralityÕ68 
reduces conflict.  Nonetheless, it is important to note that Rawls is not 
ignorant to the existence of diversity between differing religious, philosophical 
and moral doctrines, perceiving them Ôas a permanent feature of [the] public 
culture [of democratic societies].Õ69  In order to acknowledge their permanent 
existence, Political Liberalism creates two alternative spheres distinct from the 
public realm of constitutional matters and those of basic justice.  In these two 
realms of the non-public and the private, individuals can practice their 
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particular doctrines.70  The non-public sphere encompasses issues that have a 
public role but do not claim to be freestanding views, and the private sphere is 
constituted by private doctrines held by individuals, which have no bearing on 
the public realm.  By transferring diverse, conflicting doctrines away from the 
public realm, Political Liberalism constitutes an attempt at mediating pluralism 
by Ôreducing the conflict between political and other values.Õ71  In addition to 
seeking conflict reduction, the public-private separation also ensures that the 
Ôform and content [of the overlapping consensus] are not affected by the 
existing balance of political power between comprehensive doctrines.72  This 
thereby prevents citizens from withdrawing support of the political conception 
if their particular private conception should become dominant.73  It is evident 
then, that Political LiberalismÕs public-private separation aims not only toward 
conflict reduction, but also toward the social stability advocated in A Theory of 
Justice.  The relegation of comprehensive doctrines to the non-public and 
private spheres resultantly seeks to establish a stable public political arena, 
distanced from pluralist conflict and its changing power relations, whilst 
simultaneously allowing diversity to exist elsewhere.   
 
The separation of the public and private spheres is coupled with the notion of 
individual freedom, a principle that comprises a fundamental part of Political 
LiberalismÕs overlapping consensus.  Rawls explains that Ôcitizens think of 
themselves as free in three respects:  first, as having the moral power to 
form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good; second, as 
being self-authenticating sources of valid claims; and third, as capable of 
taking responsibility for their ends.Õ 74  Once citizens secure their freedom in 
these respects, Rawls perceives them to be Ôboth rationally and fully 
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autonomous.Õ75  By granting freedom to citizens in this way, Rawls seeks to 
fulfil Isaiah BerlinÕs notion of Ônegative liberty,Õ76 in which citizens Ôare free 
within the limits of political justice to pursue their (permissible) conceptions of 
the good.Õ77  In enabling the individual to pursue BerlinÕs notion of Ônegative 
liberty,Õ Political Liberalism thereby seeks to fulfil notions of fairness and 
equality advocated in A Theory of Justice, in order that comprehensive 
doctrines are protected from intervention.   
 
An additional attempt at providing the fairness and equality advocated in the 
original position is evident in RawlsÕ claim that Ôpolitical liberalism applies the 
principle of toleration to philosophy itself.Õ78  Although a diverse range of 
standpoints exists in the private sphere, Political Liberalism asserts that 
Ôothers who affirm doctrines different from ours are...certainly not 
unreasonable.Õ79  Thus in refraining from labelling diverse doctrines as 
ÔunreasonableÕ and thereby including them in society, Political Liberalism 
aspires to treat all reasonable comprehensive doctrines fairly and equally, 
irrespective of its view of them.  In so doing, Rawls employs the principle of 
toleration by which he asserts that Ôpolitical liberalism does not attack or 
criticize any reasonable view.Õ80  Thus Political Liberalism requires that citizens 
Ôsee that the burdens of judgment set limits on what can reasonably be 
justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty of conscience and 
freedom of thought,Õ81 encouraging toleration.  Evidently, then, liberal 
toleration constitutes yet another attempt at promoting fairness and equality 
by aspiring to protect the basic liberties enlisted in A Theory of JusticeÕs first 
principle of justice.   
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The importance of toleration should not be underestimated in its efforts to 
contradict the historical premise that Ôsocial unity and concord requires 
agreement on a general and comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrine.Õ82  Prior to liberal toleration, Ôintolerance was accepted as a condition 
of social order and stability,Õ83 yet, quite contrarily, Political Liberalism argues 
that it is precisely this toleration that creates social order and stability.  Rawls 
explains that when Ôthe virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet others 
halfwayÉare widespread in society and sustain its political conception of 
justice, they constitute a very great public good, part of societyÕs political 
capital.Õ84  Thereby through toleration of diverse doctrines the ideals of social 
unity and stability are promoted. 
 
RawlsÕ continuous employment of state neutrality in both A Theory of Justice 
and Political Liberalism aspires to provide principles acceptable to all citizens, 
irrespective of their loyalty to a particular comprehensive doctrine.  Owen 
explains that in so doing, ÔRawls is precisely articulating a view from 
nowhere.Õ85  In articulating a view from nowhere through both the original 
positionÕs political conception of justice and the overlapping consensus, liberal 
universalism assumes that it is possible to separate oneself from oneÕs 
attachments when choosing the principles of justice.  Liberal universalism 
takes the view that ÔI choose to ÒclotheÓ myself in these beliefs but, however 
deeply I am attached to them, they are not essentially part of who I am.Õ86  
The use of a veil of ignorance and RawlsÕ subsequent overlapping consensus 
hence infer that citizens employ their ability to distance themselves from their 
private attachments in order to make impartial decisions that serve as the 
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neutral basis of society.  However, communitarians such as Michael Sandel, 
reason that, indeed, Ôthe vaunted independence of the deontological subject is 
a liberal illusion.  It misunderstands the fundamentally ÒsocialÓ nature of man, 
the fact that we are conditioned beings Òall the way down.ÓÕ87  This 
understanding of man, in which individuals are inseparable from their 
attachments, resonates with the Nietzschean view which I wish to endorse.  
David Owen promotes such a view, claiming that liberal universalism 
underestimates the significance of these attachments to the individual, in the 
assertion that Ôthe individual and, in particular, the individualÕs self-
understanding are the product of a complex history of the entwinement of 
judgement and agency in the life of a community.Õ88  An individualÕs existence 
then, is constituted by his history, and it is thereby impossible for him to exist 
without the attachments intrinsic to that history.  As a result, the Nietzschean 
perspective rejects the possibility of drawing a dividing line to distinguish 
between a person and their attachments.  This thus affirms that, Ôour 
consciousness is inseparable from the judgements (including conceptions of 
the good) which are exhibited.Õ89  Iris Marion Young states that even if we 
create a hypothetical situation, such as the original position, in order to 
exclude the attachments of individuals, we can never achieve impartiality 
because the attachments will still exist.  She explains that, Ôfeelings, desires, 
and commitments do not cease to exist and motivate just because they have 
been excluded from the definition of moral reason.  They lurk as inarticulate 
shadows.Õ90  Liberal universalist attempts at removing attachments from the 
decision-making process are flawed.  As a result, the choosing of both the 
political conception and the overlapping consensus is neither impartial nor 
neutral.  Moreover, both A Theory of JusticeÕs conception of justice and 
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Political LiberalismÕs overlapping consensus reflect attachments intrinsic to the 
liberal tradition, and their principles are thus rooted with liberal ideas that 
reflect Ôthe ideals implicit in the public culture of a democratic society.Õ91 
Consequently, the liberal universalist attempt at associating liberalism with 
neutrality, Ôis a mistaken and self-defeating strategy.Õ92  
 
In order to demonstrate the liberal ontology that shapes liberal principles, it is 
imperative to consider them from the perspective of the ethnic communities, 
religious parties, and minority groups that exist in multicultural, pluralist 
society.  John Gray refutes the automatic prioritisation that liberal 
universalism attaches to its own values.  He demonstrates how this can curtail 
pluralism, asking why Ôliberty should always trump variety?Õ93  William Galston 
expands on this with reference to the liberal prioritisation of individual 
freedom, affirming that Ôfrom a value-pluralist standpoint, there are many 
valuable ways of life, individual and collective, that are not autonomous in the 
sense that they are not the product of conscious reflection and choice but 
rather of habit, tradition, authority, or unswerving faith.Õ94  An example of 
tradition and unswerving faith triumphing over individual freedom is apparent 
in the marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim requiring the conversion 
of the non-Muslim to Islam.  There is a clear incompatibility of values here 
between the liberal (individual freedom) and the religious (loyalty to the 
community) in which the necessity to convert clearly renders fidelity to 
tradition and faith superior.  Hence the decision to act on tradition and faith 
rather than individual freedom renders false the neutrality attached to the 
choosing of principles under the veil of ignorance.  It follows then, that its 
assumed prioritisation of liberal values is not a neutral notion at all, but one 
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that reflects its liberal roots.  Mouffe concludes that Rawls believes his political 
conception and overlapping consensus to Ôstart from the fundamental intuitive 
ideas present in our societies.  He sees it as self-evident and uncontroversial, 
but it is notÉ From the point of view [of minority groups; communities and 
religions], the ÒneutralÓ principles of rational dialogue are certainly not so.Õ95   
 
The inability to provide neutrality and impartiality is further evident if we 
analyse RawlsÕ claim that Political Liberalism does not take a stance on 
abortion.  He emphasises that liberalism does not pre-empt the outcome, but 
instead relegates the decision to public debate, rather than limiting it to the 
private sphere.96  However, since abortion is allowed to exist as a public 
option, whereas the death penalty, for instance, is banned, the restrictions 
drawn on public debate somewhat pre-empt its outcome.  In deciding which 
controversial issues are eligible to exist as options for debate, RawlsÕ liberal 
universalism is neither neutral, nor impartial.  This is highly apparent when we 
consider the view of a pro-life advocate, for whom allowing the potential for 
abortion goes against their deepest convictions.  It is therefore clear that 
RawlsÕ attempts at providing a neutral and impartial framework are flawed.  
Instead, liberal values are infused with a liberal ontology. 
 
Liberal universalism thereby excludes certain sectors of society by reasserting 
the dominance of its values through pretences to neutrality.  Yet the crux of 
the problem is not liberal universalismÕs failure to be neutral, it is the 
confidence with which it asserts such neutrality.  Young states that neutrality 
constructs a Ôhierarchical opposition between what lies inside and what lies 
outside the category, valuing more what lies inside than what lies outside.Õ97  
Thus, in insisting upon the neutrality of liberal universalism, and thereby 
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creating an ÔinsideÕ, Rawls could oppress and fragment minority groups in 
pluralist society by depicting dominant liberal interests as the most valuable, 
excluding difference as a result.  John Keane highlights the dangers of 
constructing this Ôinside,Õ demonstrating how neutrality not only negates 
difference, but also unquestioningly reaffirms the dominant hegemony.  He 
affirms that neutrality Ôperform[s] this legitimating function, paradoxically, by 
portraying the dominant private interests of civil society in grandiose 
formulations which make them appear, falsely, as detached and universal 
interests.Õ98  Thus, the content of the values Rawls offers to us are 
unquestioningly affirmed and reaffirmed as a consequence of their claims to 
neutrality and impartiality.  Ruth Abbey consequently labels liberal neutrality 
as a Ôdisguised conservationÕ since it Ôeffectively reinforces the status quo.Õ99  
The employment of liberal neutrality as a tool to legitimise the liberal 
hegemony allows liberal universalism to claim its applicability to the whole of 
society, in spite of the aforementioned incompatibilities, incommensurabilities 
and exclusions toward alternate values.  This tool consequently ensures that 
liberal principles remain uncontested.  William Connolly explains the danger 
that this poses, stating that professions to neutrality lead value-laden liberal 
principles to be perceived as Ônatural or intrinsically true standardsÕ100 that are 
Ôbeyond the need of self-problematisation and ambiguation.Õ101  Since claims 
to neutrality blind citizens to the liberal roots of the dominant values in their 
society, they become unable to challenge the legitimacy of their content.  It 
follows that when values endorsed by minority groups and communities clash 
with those advocated by liberal universalism, the minority is powerless to 
contest the liberal universalism. This renders liberalismÕs values exclusionary 
and oppressive.   
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The universal authority implicated through such professions to neutrality 
reflects the origins of liberal thought whereby Ôliberal demands were seen by 
liberals themselves as the demands, not of any sectional interest or cultural 
circle, but of all humanity.Õ102  This is evident in A Theory of Justice in which 
Rawls asserts that the principles of justice are Ôthe choice which rational men 
would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming for the 
present that this choice problem has a solution.Õ103  He thus sees the principles 
of justice to be rationally discoverable by all men.  The universality that Rawls 
attaches to the rationale of choosing such principles is explicit in his 
affirmation that Ôwe can view the agreement in the original position from the 
standpoint of one person selected at random.Õ104  Thus, the universalism in 
RawlsÕ A Theory of Justice is implicit in its attempts at both standing apart 
from conflict, and employing principles that would be chosen by all rational 
actors.  This universalism shifts in Political Liberalism whereby its adaptation 
to the concerns of a modern, democratic society abandons former possibilities 
for global application.  However, Rawls still assumes a universalist 
interpretation of human reason and rationale when employing liberal values, 
evident in his emphasis on the ÔrationalÕ and the Ôreasonable.Õ  He refers to 
Political LiberalismÕs overlapping consensus as one that all ÔrationalÕ persons 
can accept.  Chantal Mouffe explains the universality implicit in the 
employment of such rationalism in the assertion that Ôsome liberals, on 
account of their rationalism, in fact imagine that they can retain the idea of a 
truth that is discoverable by everyone.Õ105  Liberal universalismÕs usage of such 
rationalism hence assumes that liberal principles are universal values that all 
rational people will discover, labelling those that honour alternate values as 
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ÔirrationalÕ.106  Thus, liberal universalismÕs prioritisation of liberal values as 
ÔrationalÕ alongside its negation of divergent values as ÔirrationalÕ both serves 
to reaffirm the liberal hegemony, and exclude minority groups. 
 
RawlsÕ application of ÔreasonablenessÕ in Political Liberalism also stamps a 
universal authority on liberal principles.  The criterion of reciprocity that he 
outlines in The Law of Peoples requires that those proposing the terms of 
cooperation that they perceive to be the most reasonable Ômust also think it as 
at least reasonable for others to accept them.Õ
107
  Yet, as Rawls himself 
highlights, Ôwe are using our reason to describe itself and reason is not 
transparent to itself.Õ108  Thus, how can we be sure that what one sector of 
society considers to be most reasonable for them Ð and also what they claim 
to be at least reasonable to other sectors - will not be considered by the other 
sectors as entirely unreasonable?  Mouffe underscores the fundamental 
question that the notion of reasonableness begs, asking Ôwho decides what is 
and what is not ÒreasonableÓ?Õ109  In the case of liberal universalism, 
Ôreasonableness...is defined in terms of the very values and assumptions from 
which Rawls derives his political liberalism.Õ110  Thus, in granting his liberal 
universalism the authority to decide the values that Ôbest satisf[y] [the] 
conditionsÕ111 of a well-ordered liberal political society, whilst labelling some 
others as Ôunreasonable,Õ Rawls attaches a universal authority to its values.  
The danger of this, as Mouffe informs us, is that Ôwhat is at a given moment 
deemed ÒrationalÓ or ÒreasonableÓ in a community is what corresponds to the 
dominant language games and the Òcommon senseÓ that they construe.Õ112  
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Hence, the danger is that liberal universalism could employ notions of the 
ÔrationalÕ and the ÔreasonableÕ in order to reaffirm its own position as the 
dominant hegemony, whilst labelling minority groups as ÔirrationalÕ and 
ÔunreasonableÕ in order to exclude them.  This, in turn, could aggravate social 
fragmentation and oppression, increasing the potential for fundamentalist 
conflict.    
 
The danger of the universalism that liberal neutrality invokes is that it 
Ôtranslates some of the very intrasubjective and intersubjective 
differencesÉinto modes of otherness to be assimilated, punished, or 
liquidated.Õ113  Insistence upon the universalism of such values thereby results 
in the marginalisation of alternate faiths whereby liberal universalism 
suppresses their diversity into a negative Other to be eradicated.  Connolly 
explains that Ôthe more relentless the drive to universalize an existential faith, 
the more its supporters experience otherwise tolerable differences to be forms 
of persecution demanding reprisal.Õ114  Indeed, the imposition of liberalism as 
a universal doctrine could aggravate multicultural conflict by firstly excluding 
those who honour divergent values and subsequently prohibiting them from 
challenging it.  However, it is liberal universalismÕs blindness to its own 
universality that truly renders it an oppressive theory.  This is evident in 
Political Liberalism in which Rawls professes to have abandoned claims to 
universality by concentrating his theory on democratic societies through which 
he claims to offer Ôno specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond 
what is implied by the political conception itself.Õ115  However, the continued 
usage of the ÔrationalÕ and the ÔreasonableÕ contradicts this assertion.  Connolly 
claims that when liberal universalists consider fundamentalism, Ôthey project 
fundamentalism solely onto the other and fail to recognize its strains in 
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themselves.Õ116  In so doing, liberal universalism can aggravate pluralist 
conflict, further oppressing and fragmenting minorities by labelling others as 
fundamentalists, whilst failing to consider their own role. 
 
Aspirations toward neutrality and universality are demonstrated by the 
separation employed in Political Liberalism between the public and private 
spheres.  Through this distinction, Rawls separates society into three parts; 
the public sphere of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice; the 
non-public realm of matters that affect the public sphere but do not claim 
impartiality; and finally, the private sphere of private assumptions and values 
that have no bearing on public issues.117  Thus in order to ensure that all of 
society can adhere to this consensus, Rawls aspires to neutrality in the public 
sphere by restricting Ôthe consensus he hopes to achieve to political justice.Õ118  
In so doing, liberal universalism assumes that Ôthe thinner the normative 
standard, the more universal its claim.Õ119  As a result, the public sphere 
narrows its focus to politics, comprised of constitutional essentials and 
legislation, in order to provide a neutral consensus that can be universally 
applicable.  However, since liberal universalist attempts of separating people 
from their attachments failed, so too does the attempt to separate the political 
neatly from the private.  Thus in attempting to limit the public sphere to the 
purely political, Rawls restricts his public sphere to a thin consensus.  As a 
result of the narrow limits of this consensus, the public sphere becomes void 
of substance.  Mouffe affirms this in the assertion that, Ôbetween the 
ÒreasonableÓ and the ÒrationalÓ there is no space left for something properly 
political, whose nature we could establish independently of morality or 
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economics.Õ120  This is explained by the very fact that the political cannot be so 
easily separated from the private.  Rather, Ôthe frontier between public and 
private is not given once and for all but constructed and constantly shifting.Õ121  
The fluid nature of this divide is highly evident in the evolution of rights for 
women.  In this instance, the private doctrine held by feminists required a 
modification of the basic liberties in order to encompass the concerns of 
women.  It is thus evident that often, private attachments spill over into the 
public sphere.  A theory that seeks to prevent this is exclusionary toward the 
concerns of minority groups in society, such as women.  Furthermore, the 
very fact that the dominant sector of society, i.e. liberalism, decides where to 
draw the boundaries between the public, non-public and private spheres, 
renders these exclusions oppressive.  As the example of rights for women 
demonstrates, it is often the case that values perceived by liberals as ÔprivateÕ, 
and thereby making no impact on political matters, are viewed by others as 
highly political.  In failing to recognise this, liberal universalismÕs public-private 
distinction is exclusionary and oppressive.  It is evident then, that the shifting 
overlap between morality and politics is both inevitable and essential to 
making decisions about controversial political issues.  Through seeking to draw 
a fixed line between the public and private spheres, liberal universalism 
constitutes an attempt at discovering a common, neutral political arena 
distinct from moral conflict, but in so doing restricts decision-making to politics 
and has Ôemptied politics of all substance.Õ122  In this way, minority groups in 
pluralist society are restricted from full participation in the public realm, and 
are excluded and oppressed by the dominant majority.  
 
The liberal prioritisation of individual freedom constitutes an attempt at 
ensuring the freedom and equality of all peoples advocated in the original 
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position.  However, Owen asserts that this individual freedom is curtailed since 
liberal universalism fails to understand Ôthat the maintenance of our capacities 
for autonomous reflection and agency is dependent on communal practices.Õ123  
As a consequence of both the thin consensus that founds the public sphere, 
and the requirement of the fixed public-private distinction that individuals 
remove their communal attachments before making judgements, liberal 
universalism prevents the individual from making genuinely autonomous 
decisions.  Since the individual is unable to remove himself from these 
attachments, and as such his existence is constituted by them, then the liberal 
universalist insistence upon their removal prevents the individual from acting 
as himself, thereby depriving him of his freedom.  Meanwhile, liberal 
universalist claims to neutrality impose a universal superiority, enabling its 
values to be brought into the public sphere.  Hence, Marcuse concludes that 
one can only be truly free during the Ôdiscussion and promotion of alternative 
policies within the status quo.Õ124  Therefore liberal universalismÕs failure to 
recognise that individuals are constituted by the attachments of their history, 
community, ethnicity and religion requires that citizens remove part of 
themselves and behave instrumentally.  This resultantly deprives individuals of 
the ability to act autonomously, thereby prohibiting them from the individual 
freedom that liberal citizens are granted.  The public prevalence of liberal 
attachments limits genuine freedom to liberals during political decision-
making, re-affirming the liberal hegemony, and oppressing minorities as a 
result.  This could once again lead to the aggravation of social fragmentation, 
leading to further pluralist conflict. 
 
In addition to employing the principle of autonomy in an attempt to provide a 
fair and equal framework aside from comprehensive doctrines, liberal 
                                                
123 Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity, p. 138. 
124 Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 2. 
 42 
universalism also endorses the notion of toleration.  However, Owen informs 
us that only a limited version of toleration is applied.  He claims that liberal 
universalism is Ôtolerant only to the extent that its own presuppositions are 
accepted.Õ125  That is to say, liberal universalism offers toleration only to those 
who accept its principles, thus employing the notion to secure its own position.   
Such toleration is not fully extensive, excluding those who refuse its principles 
as ÔirrationalÕ or Ôunreasonable.Õ  Even more significantly, liberal universalism 
utilises the principle of toleration to secure itself as the current dominant 
hegemony, not only presently, but also for the future.  As Owen 
demonstrates, Ôbecause [RawlsÕ liberal universalism] argues that a rational 
commitment to tolerance is only possible on the basis of the kind of argument 
it provides, it rules out of court (as necessarily irrational) any contestation of 
its criteria of tolerance.Õ126  Thus, not only does liberal universalism only 
tolerate those who accept its principles, it also secures the future precedence 
of liberal values by preventing other honourable values from challenging its 
criteria.  Since a comprehensive doctrine is only tolerated if it Ôaccepts liberal 
principles as binding,Õ127 Connolly describes toleration as Ôone perspective 
exercising hegemony over the culture [which] allows others to exist as 
enclaves within it.Õ128  Rather than encouraging diversity to flourish, such 
toleration ensures that pluralism operates within liberal realms, thereby 
limiting the existence of doctrines to those that are Ôdeprived of substance.Õ129  
This consequently ensures that comprehensive doctrines are Ôdenied equal 
standing with mainstream society,Õ130 and must therefore reaffirm liberal 
dominance in order to be tolerated.  The resultant position of minorities as 
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inferior citizens causes further concerns for social fragmentation and 
fundamentalism.  
 
Such attempts at separating citizens from their attachments then, deprive 
minority citizens of the individual freedom and toleration sufficient to contest 
the liberal hegemony.  Oppression arises since liberal universalism Ôbrings a 
private and contestable secular faith into the public sphere while refusing to 
sanction the same privilege to nonsecular faiths.Õ131  This polarisation between 
the encouragement of liberal attachments and the prohibition of non-liberal 
attachments grants liberal citizens full freedom, whilst non-liberals Ôare treated 
instrumentally.Õ132  It follows from this that Ôthe official ideology of liberal 
societyÉis of course diversity... [but] the liberal reality is more and more 
sameness.Õ133  Thus in spite of its claims of providing individual freedom and 
toleration, liberal universalism only tolerates minority groups when they are 
separated from their attachments and comply to liberal norms.  This is 
detrimental to pluralist society in which Ôcultural groups want more than just 
mere survival; they want also the conditions and resources to be vibrant 
communities worthy of self-respect and respect from others.Õ134  It also adds 
to the threat of social fragmentation since, as Connolly explains, Ôeveryone 
does not become the same in a normalizing society.  The opposite is more 
likely to occur.Õ135  This is evident through todayÕs threat of terrorism, in which 
the imposition of Western values has had a fragmentary effect on diverse 
cultural groups and led to the emergence of Islamic extremism.  
Consequently, fundamentalist conflict could be exacerbated by the oppression 
minorities feel as a result of their inability to express their individual freedom.   
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In sum, liberal universalist theories influenced by that of John Rawls, provide 
commendable attempts at conflict mediation.  In aiming towards neutrality, 
they seek to create a fair and equal basis to provide a stable society distanced 
from private moral conflicts.  They additionally aspire to provide individual 
freedom and toleration to encourage the fair and equal prospering of private 
doctrines.  Yet, these attempts at neutrality are fundamentally flawed since 
individuals cannot detach themselves from their assumptions.  The values 
Rawls employs are thus inherently liberal, and often unable to escape the 
incompatible and incommensurable conflicts that occur between value systems 
in pluralist society.  As a result, claims to neutrality are problematic since they 
hinder the contestation of liberal values, consequently impeding opportunities 
for the appreciation of alternative values, and suppressing diversity as a 
consequence.  Moreover, neutrality imposes a universalistic authority, 
excluding those who disagree with the values it endorses, thereby aggravating 
oppression and social fragmentation.  Furthermore, such universalism renders 
RawlsÕ liberalism a form of fundamentalism as a consequence of its failure to 
acknowledge its own potential for essentialism.  Through seeking neutrality 
and universality, liberal universalism renders itself an incontestable doctrine, 
which consequently suppresses cultural diversity.  The public-private divide is 
exclusionary to minority groups as it fails to recognise the spill over of private 
interests into the public domain.  Additionally, these exclusions are rendered 
oppressive by the fact that it is the dominant sector of society who decides 
where to draw the boundaries between the public, non-public and private 
spheres.  In so doing, RawlsÕ liberal universalism restricts citizens from 
employing genuine freedom and toleration, excluding minority groups as a 
result.  Liberal universalismÕs insistence on neutrality and universality, 
alongside its public-private distinction, render it an oppressive doctrine.  Since 
liberal domination is reaffirmed at the detriment of pluralism, this could lead 
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to further social fragmentation and the escalation of conflict, such as rises in 
religious terrorism, increased support for the Far-Right, and a repeat of the UK 
riots. 
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ÔMany people face conflicts among values for which there is no single right 
solution.  The fact that ways of life honour different goods and virtues is not a 
mark of imperfection.  It is a sign that humans can live well in different ways.Õ  
(John Gray, 2000) 
 
In examining the work of John Rawls, chapter one aspired to draw out the 
fundamental difficulties intrinsic to liberal universalist theories.  Neutrality and 
universality were subsequently exposed to be false pretences, posing 
obstacles to the contestation of dominant values, which excludes and 
oppresses minority groups as a result.  Furthermore, it attempted to 
demonstrate that both individual freedom and toleration serve to reaffirm the 
liberal hegemony, and resultantly exclude those who cannot adhere to liberal 
values.  It also sought to reveal how the fixed public-private distinction 
excludes citizens in an oppressive manner, suppressing pluralism and 
fragmenting society as a consequence.  This chapter will focus on post-liberal 
thinker John Gray, who draws influence from the work of Isaiah Berlin and 
Joseph Raz and who attempts to create a value-pluralist interpretation of 
liberalism.   
 
In this chapter, I seek to analyse the effectiveness of the post-liberal 
challenge in overcoming liberal universalismÕs oppressive, exclusionary and 
often fragmentary nature.  Firstly, I will outline BerlinÕs value pluralism, which 
illustrates the three ways in which value conflict is inevitable in pluralist 
society.  Then, I will demonstrate how this has led to the development of 
GrayÕs three forms of incommensurability, highlighting our inability to measure 
the relative worth of the conflicting values.  Subsequently, these three 
incommensurabilities will be used both to illustrate liberalismÕs inability to 
escape value conflict, and to contest the notion that acceptance of value 
incommensurability necessarily declines into relativism, in which all moral 
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standards are abolished.  Following its exposition of inevitable 
incommensurability, this chapter will show the post-liberal abandonment of 
neutral or universal forms of liberalism.  It will discuss GrayÕs neglect of the 
liberal universalist construction of fixed value hierarchies, in favour of a more 
political system, founded on radical choice rather than rational, which insists 
upon the contingency of decision-making.  Finally, it will endorse GrayÕs 
rejection of neutrality and universality in favour of a more political, radical and 
contingent system but contest that to be consistent with these aims, it must 
address the public-private distinction.      
 
In discussing how liberal universalism suppresses multicultural diversity in 
pluralist society, it is essential to begin with an exploration of value pluralism.  
Gray begins with BerlinÕs three levels of value pluralism. The first of these 
affirms that value conflicts are inevitable within any given morality, and that 
when these arise neither theoretical nor practical reasoning has the power to 
resolve them.136  For instance, even in societies where liberty and equality are 
valued by all, the principles Ôoften collide in practice.Õ137  This is evident in the 
notion of positive discrimination, which demonstrates that, if all citizens are 
treated equally - and hence the liberal principle of equality is endorsed - then 
the individual liberties of ethnic minorities or those with disabilities can 
actually be curtailed.  Thus, since equal treatment does not necessarily lead to 
equality, the principle of equality often collides with that of liberty.  It is 
thereby often the case that for citizens to become equals and receive full 
access to their individual liberties, positive discrimination is necessary.138  
When conflicts occur between two legitimate values such as liberty and 
equality, Gray tells us that we cannot employ a theory to rank the relative 
worth of these values since Ôwe lack the scales on which these goods might be 
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weighed.Õ139  Thus although liberty and equality are both honourable virtues, 
when they collide, it must be circumstance and not theory, which informs us of 
how we are to act.   
 
Secondly, as Berlin explores through the idea of positive and negative freedom 
in Two Concepts of Liberty,140 each individual good itself, is Ôinternally complex 
and inherently pluralistic, containing conflicting elements, some of which are 
constitutive incommensurables.Õ141  As a result of the internal diversity of each 
value then, conflicts are even inevitable within a single value, such as 
freedom.  Conflicts may occur, for instance, between those who advocate 
freedom of information and those who safeguard freedom of privacy, even 
though both parties seek to represent the same value of freedom.  Just as no 
theory can dictate the outcome when two different values clash, the internal 
conflict of a particular value must be decided upon by the very context from 
which Rawls seeks to distance it.   
 
Thirdly, Berlin refers to cultural variations, which, in spite of endorsing some 
overlapping values, will give rise to further incommensurabilities by the 
prioritisation of different values.142  When a Muslim marries a non-Muslim, as 
in a previous example, it is often imperative that the non-Muslim convert to 
Islam.  Therefore, despite similarities between liberal and Islamic cultural 
values, in this instance a conflict may arise between the liberal promotion of 
the non-MuslimÕs individual freedom (in which the individual could decide not 
to convert), and the Islamic prioritisation of allegiance to the religion and 
community (in which the individual must marry into the faith).  Hence, conflict 
across cultural values lacks the theoretical scale on which values can be 
ranked, and the outcome must once again be circumstantial.    
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Gray employs BerlinÕs three components of value pluralism in order to develop 
three forms of incommensurabilities that inevitably arise between values in 
multicultural society.  The first refers to conventions that prevent goods being 
exchanged for one another, such as the trading off of money for friendship.  
Gray explains that, although both money and friendship are valuable goods, 
social norms in Western society forbid individuals from paying friends for 
giving their time.  As a result, money cannot be exchanged for friendship, and 
we cannot compare their relative worth.  Consequently, two different values 
cannot be ranked on the same scale, rendering theory powerless in comparing 
their worth against one another.143  This is a direct contradiction to RawlsÕ A 
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, which rank justice as the highest 
principle; and privilege the basic liberties over all other values. 
 
In the second instance of incommensurability, the same value is honoured by 
different cultures, but its meaning is interpreted in conflicting ways.  Gray 
illustrates that Ôin art, we can identify the best among works belonging to the 
same genre, yet their styles may be too far apart for any judgement of 
relative worth among the best to be a possibility.  Much the same holds in 
ethics.Õ144  This is evident in the varying understandings of the term 
Ôhappiness.Õ  Interpretations of this term will diverge according to the various 
conceptions of the good that people follow.  In the same way that it is 
impossible to compare diverse styles of art even though they are categorised 
in the same genre, it is impossible to compare the relative worth of the 
assortment of understandings, even though they are all grouped under the 
term Ôhappiness.Õ   
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The third and final notion of GrayÕs incommensurabilities occurs when different 
cultures value entirely different goods and virtues.  Raz explains that 
incommensurability and incompatibility arise between cultures when Ôone 
yields the conclusion that something is good, and the other the conclusion that 
the very thing is, in virtue of the same properties, without value, or even 
bad.Õ145  This is evident in the institution of marriage whereby different 
cultures perceive it as a reflection of a range of different virtues.  For example, 
arranged marriages aspire towards the fulfilment of socio-economic virtues, 
whereas Islamic marriages must reflect religious and communal allegiance by 
either occurring within the Islamic faith, or requiring the non-Muslim to 
convert to Islam.   In the same way that Ôit makes no sense to try to rank the 
excellence of Shakespeare, say, against that of the French classicists, Corneille 
and Racine,Õ146 it is impossible to rank the various virtues of marriage 
honoured in different cultures.  Raz explains that this impossibility arises from 
a lack of criteria on which to value the worth of these goods.  He explains that 
Ôa good novelist, for example, might be judged by his humour, his insight and 
his imaginativeness and his ability to plot.  It is possible that our weighting of 
the different criteria does not establish a complete ranking of all possible 
combinations.Õ147  Since pluralist citizens diverge on the conceptions of the 
good they pursue, it follows that the criteria upon which they measure values 
will diverge accordingly.  Thus, it is impossible to rank the relative worth of 
the conflicting values intrinsic to marriage since citizens in arranged marriages 
are pursuing different conceptions of the good to citizens in Islamic marriages.  
The values they allege to need to be assessed according to different criteria 
and cannot be measured against one another.   
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Resultantly then, the combination of BerlinÕs three components of value 
pluralism with GrayÕs three modes of incommensurability show that, within 
pluralist society, it is not that conflict arises from Ôoccasional pockets of 
incommensurability,Õ but rather that Ôincommensurability is pretty pervasive in 
human life.Õ148 In addition to highlighting the inevitability of incompatibilities 
and incommensurabilities between values, Berlin and Gray both reject the 
notion that conflicts can be resolved by ranking the relevant values against 
one another in terms of their worth: 
 
ÔValues are incommensurable when they cannot be expressed 
either in terms of each other or by reference to a third term that 
could serve as a standard unit of measure for comparing them.  
Thus, if value pluralism is the case, we are confronted with a 
situation where we have conflicting moral duties that cannot be 
put into a rank order of importance.Õ149   
 
Berlin and Gray instead seek to advocate the view that conflict arises since 
Ôthere are many incompatible and yet decent and worthwhile routes through 
life,Õ150 and thus their relative worth cannot be ranked.  
 
William Connolly informs us that many critics, such as Leo Strauss, confuse 
the rejection of fixed value hierarchies such as RawlsÕ, with Ôcultural relativism, 
Òabsolute tolerance,Ó or Òthe abandonment of all standards.ÓÕ151  However, it is 
essential to note that neither BerlinÕs value pluralism nor GrayÕs three 
incommensurabilities decline into relativism.  The notion of 
incommensurability states that two values cannot be ranked against one 
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another under a given circumstance, yet it does not claim that the values in 
question cannot be compared to a conception of the good.  When measured 
against a particular conception of the good, one value will rank higher.  With 
regards to euthanasia, for instance, an individual may rank preservation of life 
higher than quality of life with respect to his conception of the good.  However 
were one of his family members to become fatally ill and suffer immense pain, 
circumstance renders the relative worth of preservation of life and quality of 
life incommensurable goods.  In this instance, preservation of life would 
triumph as the most valuable good when measured against a conception of 
the good, but when the quality of a family memberÕs life is at stake, the 
relative worth of the two goods cannot be compared.  Thus, although we 
cannot measure the two values against one another, we can still rank them 
against our notion of the good, preventing incommensurability from declining 
into relativism.  As Moore explains, Ôpluralism makes it impossible to show that 
any value system (such as liberalism) is morally preferable but that there are 
nonetheless some ways of life that are demonstrably immoral.Õ152  Indeed, 
there are some instances in which values are perceived to be entirely 
unworthy.  Gray affirms that through his three conceptions of 
incommensurability, he does not wish to assert that Ôthere are not poor forms 
of life, cultural as well as individual, which exhibit few excellences, if any, and 
which are not recognizably any sort of flourishing.Õ153  Hence, the value 
pluralist proposition that conflicts can be resolved in multiple ways does not 
prevent the exclusion of certain principles if they are considered poor with 
respect to a conception of the good.  The difference to RawlsÕ liberal 
universalism is that the boundaries of the acceptable and unacceptable are not 
defined through consultation with a theoretical scale, but rely on the 
circumstance in which the forms of life arise.   
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Rawls acknowledges the inevitability of conflict between divergent 
comprehensive doctrines, as is evident in both A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism.154  Yet, he perceives liberal values to be separable from this, 
aspiring to employ these in order Ôto state principles of right and justice that 
stand aloof from these conflicts.Õ155  Gray contests the efficacy of such an 
ambition, contending that liberal values fail to escape conflict with one 
another, since Ôone basic liberty clashes with another, or with the same basic 
liberty, or with important social values that are not basic liberties.Õ156  Berlin 
demonstrates this with the example of positive and negative freedom in which 
the two conceptions Ôare rival goods; one negative liberty from coercion and 
interference will conflict with another; a positive freedom which protects one 
aspect of personal autonomy can be promoted only by restraining some 
negative liberties.Õ157  Therefore, just as money and friendship cannot be 
measured against one another, nor can freedom of privacy and freedom of 
speech.  Liberal value-conflicts thus require a judgement to be made about 
the relative worth of the liberties in question, and yet this ranking would vary 
according to the decision-maker, just as in non-liberal value conflicts.  Gray 
explains that Ôpeople with differing conceptions of human interests, or who 
differ in the importance they give to the interests they agree in recognizing, 
will make different judgements as to which liberties are basic.Õ158  It follows 
then, that as in the examples of GrayÕs three forms of incommensurability, 
different people would rank freedom of speech, freedom of privacy and 
freedom of information differently, according to their conceptions of the good.  
Thus Gray affirms that RawlsÕ claim in which reasonable people can agree on 
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the greatest liberty, is flawed, since circumstance renders it Ôindeterminate to 
the last degree.Õ159      
 
LiberalismÕs inability to escape these incompatible and incommensurable 
conflicts is equally evident in GrayÕs second principle of incommensurability, 
which concerns itself with competing interpretations of a single value.  As Gray 
affirms, Ôevery right is a bundle of potentially rival claims, because the 
interests that any right protects are many, and often at odds.Õ160  Rival 
understandings of the same value are fundamental to the recent debate over 
the wearing of the burkha in liberal society.  A primary argument in favour of 
the wearing of the burkha is that it reflects freedom of expression with respect 
to the individualÕs freedom to demonstrate allegiance to a particular religion 
and community.  However, freedom of expression is also a central argument 
made by those who wish to ban the burkha, which is perceived to oppress the 
individualÕs self-expression.  Both cultures honour freedom of expression, but 
one interprets it in the religious, communal sense, while the other perceives it 
from the standpoint of the individual.  Although different people honour the 
same value, conflict still exists within the value because Ôthe meaning of 
[freedom] is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to 
resist.Õ161  Just as it is unfeasible to compare the varying perceptions of 
happiness, the same is true for freedom of expression since, in spite of 
belonging to the same genre, the diverse forms strands within that genre are 
incomparable.  Thus, quite apart from standing at a distance from 
multicultural conflict, each individual liberal value itself is Ôinternally complex 
and even pluralistic.Õ162   
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Furthermore, liberal values also become enmeshed in incommensurable 
conflict when they collide with non-liberal principles.  This is evident in the 
earlier example of the marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim whereby 
the non-Muslim must convert to Islam.  As we have witnessed, the liberal 
value of individual freedom comes into conflict with the cultural value of 
allegiance to the religion and community.  Since Islam honours religious and 
communal loyalty and liberalism upholds individual freedom, the two 
communities allege to different principles in the pursuit of their varying 
conceptions of the good.  Resultantly, the relative worth of two values held by 
different cultures cannot be compared because they each require different 
criteria upon which to assess their worth.  Once again then, liberal values are 
intertwined with multicultural conflict.  Liberal universalismÕs insistence that its 
values stand apart from such conflict thus render it an oppressive theory by 
asserting individual freedom as the neutral, universal value to be honoured, 
resultantly converting those who prioritise allegiance to their community and 
religion as negative Others.   
 
Since liberal values are equally enmeshed in conflict as non-liberal values, and 
since insistence otherwise evidently leads to the oppression of minorities, Gray 
demonstrates how we must resultantly refute liberal claims to neutrality.  
Firstly, he highlights RawlsÕ failure to recognise the controversy of liberal 
values, challenging whether the basic liberties, the difference principle and 
RawlsÕ treatment of abortion actually Ôare uncontroversial applications or 
developments of an overlapping consensus.Õ163  BerlinÕs three instances of 
value-conflict demonstrate the controversy over these principles, showing the 
inevitability of three types of clashes: amongst these values; within each value 
itself; and between liberal and cultural values.  Where these clashes arise, 
they reflect competing notions of the good.  Thus, contrary to Rawlsian 
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attempts at providing a neutral, universally acceptable plane, liberal values 
mirror a liberal conception of the good.  Gray clarifies that Ôany standpoint we 
adopt is that of a particular form of life and of the historic practices that 
constitute it.Õ164  Consequently, liberal values are controversial because they 
seek to promote a particular conception of the good, but their neutrality claims 
not to do so.  Raz thereby proposes that liberal universalism abandon its 
pretences of neutrality and acknowledge instead that its freedoms are rooted 
in the liberal conception of the good.165   
 
Since liberal universalism fails to escape incommensurable value conflicts in 
society because it is not neutral in relation to the good, its claims to universal 
authority are inherently flawed.  Berlin tells us that, influenced by Plato, 
Western philosophy has long since been based on three assumptions:  firstly, 
that each significant question only has one correct answer; secondly, that 
there is a method of discovering these correct answers; and, finally, that all of 
these answers are compatible with one another.166  This metaphysical view of 
the world assumes that, Ôthere are, out there in the world, real essences which 
it is our duty to discover and which are disposed to assist in our discovery.Õ167  
This is echoed in the philosophy of John RawlsÕ A Theory of Justice, in which 
the neutrality and universality attached to justice and the basic liberties make 
them appear as correct answers; the original position and the veil of ignorance 
provide methods for discovering such answers; and RawlsÕ fixed hierarchy of 
rights implies compatibility between the goods in question.  Gray asserts that 
subsequent Enlightenment thinking expanded on this by seeking to attach 
universal authority to human reason.168  In spite of RawlsÕ claims that his work 
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steers clear of the ambitions of the ÔEnlightenment project of finding a 
philosophical secular doctrine, one founded on reason and yet 
comprehensive,Õ169 his attempts at placing a universal stamp on human reason 
are evident in the previously discussed boundaries that he draws between the 
ÔreasonableÕ and the ÔunreasonableÕ.  The universal authority he grants to the 
reasonableness of his principles is equally manifest through the employment 
of toleration, which is restricted to those that accept, and thus reaffirm, his 
values.  Gray explains that, in this manner, Ôtoleration requires the liberal 
rational consensus to endure alternate values in the expectation that they will 
disappear.Õ170  On this view diversity is not celebrated, but instead, something 
that Ôwe judge to be undesirable, false or at least inferior; our toleration 
expresses the conviction that, despite its badness, the object of toleration 
should be left alone.Õ171  This is evident in Britain whereby the prohibition of 
gay marriage shows societyÕs view of homosexuals as inferior citizens.  
Recently, the alternate creation of civil partnerships demonstrates attempts to 
endure, rather than celebrate sexual diversity, allowing it to exist despite its 
Otherness.  This perspective of toleration, demonstrated by the discrepancy 
between homosexual and heterosexual rights, illustrates RawlsÕ perception of 
dominant, liberal values as superior to diverse, pluralistic ones, which Ôaccepts 
with regret the fact that there are many ways of life.Õ172   
 
Yet it is this idea that liberal universalism has discovered a universal set of 
values, which is fundamentally flawed.  As BerlinÕs value pluralism and GrayÕs 
three incommensurabilities demonstrate, each conflict of values Ð including 
those comprised of liberal values - has several potential answers depending on 
the actors involved; we lack a scale upon which to rank the values.  Thus the 
metaphysical claim that there are universally discoverable answers is flawed 
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because conflict amongst legitimate values shows that multiple correct 
answers can exist and, furthermore, that there is no scale on which to 
discover their relative worth.  Thus, Ôif we are to have as many types of 
perfection as there are types of culture, each with its deal constellation of 
virtues, then the very notion of the possibility of a single perfect society is 
logically incoherent.Õ173  Hence, contrary to RawlsÕ theory - in which justice is 
the first value, followed by the basic liberties - there can be no one fixed 
hierarchy of values on which everyone can agree.  Gray rejects the notion of 
ÔperfectionÕ as convergence on a single hierarchy of values, promoting instead 
a system of value pluralism, which requires multiple potential value outcomes 
in order to reflect the various interpretations of such Ôperfection.Õ  Gray 
resultantly promotes an alternative form of modus vivendi of toleration, which 
problematises the Rawlsian view in which liberal values constitute the superior 
mainstream upon which all other doctrines rely for their existence.  Rather, he 
asserts that, Ôtoleration is valued as a condition of peace, and divergent ways 
of living are welcomed as marks of diversity in the good life.Õ174  This view of 
toleration rejects the three Platonic assumptions that there is one correct 
answer to each question; that this answer is discoverable; and that the 
various answers to the different questions are compatible with one another. 
Gray insists instead that value conflicts often arise to which there are multiple 
solutions, and rather than viewing this as a sign of imperfection, it is a positive 
aspect of value pluralism that humans can flourish in a variety of manners.175  
This is significant to resisting the oppression that ensues from liberal 
universalism and its notion of toleration.  If we extend GrayÕs toleration to the 
gay community, it is apparent that, rather than merely tolerating sexual 
diversity despite its ÔbadnessÕ, homosexuality would be celebrated as diversity, 
rather than perceived as a negative Other to be eliminated.  It is apparent 
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then, that pluralist society requires a form of toleration that celebrates diverse 
lifestyles in order to overcome the exclusionary nature of liberal universalism 
and its subsequent tendency to aggravate social fragmentation.   
 
As a result of post-liberalismÕs abandonment of universalism in favour of a 
plurality of answers, Moore informs us that Ôthe fact of value pluralism means 
that neither liberalism nor any substantive doctrine can claim a privileged 
place.Õ176  Indeed, Gray purports that Ôliberal cultures and liberal states must 
renounce any claim to universal authority, and learn to live in harmony with 
other, non-liberal cultures and polities.Õ177  He states that the legitimacy of a 
regime should depend, not on its universal authority, but rather on its ability 
to satisfy the cultural needs of its citizens.178  Importantly, Gray observes that 
it is often the case that liberalism is not the best system to fulfil this criterion.  
For example, the Ottoman Empire was perceived to be illiberal - since it failed 
to provide the individual freedom to grant citizens the right to leave 
communities - however it was an incredibly tolerant regime, enabling many 
different ways of life to flourish.179  Thus with regards to toleration, it is 
evident that liberal regimes are not automatically the most effective in 
reflecting the needs of their citizens.  It is thereby evident that the 
universalism attached to RawlsÕ liberal universalism is unfounded and 
Ôrepresents an unwarranted liberal imperialism,Õ180 which must be abandoned.  
Gray consequently perceives liberalism to be Ôat best only one cultural form 
among the many that must seek coexistence through compromise.Õ181 He 
explains that his post-liberal alternative Ôcontinues the liberal search for 
peaceful coexistence; but it does so by giving up the belief that one way of 
                                                
176 Moore, ÔPluralism, Relativism, and Liberalism,Õ p. 252. 
177 Gray, Liberalism, p. 96. 
178 Ibid, p. X.  
179 Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 109. 
180 Galston, ÔValue Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory,Õ p. 769. 
181 Crowder, George, ÔTwo Concepts of Liberal PluralismÕ in Political Theory, 35(2): 2007, p. 122 
 61 
life, or a single type of regime, could be best for all.Õ182  Mouffe also supports 
calls for the abandonment of universality, asserting that Rawls' ÔJustice as 
Fairness is only one among the possible interpretations of the political 
principles of equality and libertyÉit must be seen as an intervention in an 
ongoing debate and cannot pretend to a privileged status with respect to other 
more or less radical interpretations.Õ183  In this way, post-liberalism could 
overcome the oppressive nature of liberal universalism by abandoning 
universalism, and hence creating avenues for non-liberals to contest its 
principles.                 
 
It follows from GrayÕs rejection of universalism that the fixed value hierarchy 
that Rawls adheres to should also be abandoned.  Raz explains this, refuting 
its assumption Ôthat there is a true value behind the ranking of options, and 
that the ranking is a kind of technique for measuring this value.Õ184  Indeed, 
BerlinÕs value pluralism has already demonstrated the impossibility of RawlsÕ 
theory in ranking incommensurable values relative to one another.  Thus, 
value conflict is conceptual rather than empirical,185 and RawlsÕ numerical 
ordering of values is thereby inconsistent with the essence of conflict.  
Although RawlsÕ liberal universalism employs this fixed hierarchy of values, it 
claims to provide a practical account of pluralism by Ôteasing out the 
presuppositions and implications of an actually existing overlapping consensus 
in society on important issues about liberty and justice.Õ186  However, the very 
fact that Rawls constructs a theory to prescribe a fixed order of ranked 
principles signifies that decisions are made pre-politically Ôby theoretical 
reasonings whose results are entrenched in constitutional law.Õ187  This 
prevents his theory from adapting to the conflicts that arise within pluralist 
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politics.  As Mouffe explains, Ôthe liberal idea that the general interest results 
from the free play of private interests, and that a universal rational consensus 
could come out of free discussion, blinds liberalism to the phenomenon of the 
political.Õ188 Resultantly, RawlsÕ attempts at distancing values from political life, 
means that the decisions made Ôare not upshots of political discourse, or 
aspects of any real settlement or agreement achieved in actual political 
practice, but theorems, products of the peculiar species of theoretical 
reasoning.Õ189  As a result of distancing value-conflict from politics then, the 
fixed hierarchy of values inherent in RawlsÕ liberal universalism suppresses 
politics in two ways.   
 
Firstly, the values in question are ranked in terms of their relative worth 
without consideration of their changing contexts.  Gray perceives this as the 
abandonment of Ôthe richness and depth of moral life, with all of its 
undecidable dilemmas, for the empty vistas of moral theory.Õ190  Although 
Rawls acknowledges that Ôeven firmly held convictions change,Õ191 his pre-
political construction of a ranking order removes values from their context and 
hence, cannot adapt to the richness and depth of moral life.  RazÕs social 
dependence theory informs us of the emptiness of politics which ensues from 
ranking values prior to their political context, stating that Ôthere is no point to 
value without valuers.  No point to beauty without people, or other valuers, 
who can appreciate it.  No point to the value of love without lovers.  No point 
in the value of truth without potential knowers.Õ192  Gray observes that, 
Ôoutside of their contexts in social practices, no value can be attached to goods 
such as justice and friendship.  They acquire their meaning and worth from 
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the histories, needs and goals of human subjects and the ways of life to which 
they belong.Õ193  Theories such as RawlsÕ are thus only successful on a 
theoretical level as they fail to grant values sufficient content since they are 
extracted from the pluralist environment in which conflict occurs.  Rorty 
concludes that such Ôfinal vocabulariesÕ are seen Ôas poetic achievements 
rather than as fruits of diligent inquiry according to antecedently formulated 
criteria.Õ194  How, for example, are we to suppose that justice necessarily 
triumphs freedom of consciousness if we are ignorant of the situation and 
people that require them?   
 
Fixed value hierarchies also suppress politics by removing opportunities for 
legitimate alternative values.  By granting a fixed order to its values, RawlsÕ 
liberal universalism leads to the Ôentrenchment of these principles so that they 
are immune from the contingencies of political life.Õ195  Thus, a theory that 
ranks justice and the basic liberties as the highest principles automatically 
ignores legitimate values that clash with these privileged values.  Yet, if the 
theory were to consider such alternatives, in many cases the conflicting value 
may actually be more complimentary to a citizenÕs conception of the good than 
the prescribed value.  To illustrate this, we shall now return to the clash 
between individual freedom and allegiance to the religion/community when a 
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim requires the conversion of the 
non-Muslim.  Perhaps the individual required to convert prioritises romantic 
love over individual freedom, and therefore respects the importance of 
allegiance to the Islamic religion and community.  Since RawlsÕ liberal 
universalism attaches universal authority to individual freedom, and would 
thus view the decision to convert to Islam as Otherness, the individual 
becomes excluded and oppressed.  Yet, since GrayÕs post-liberalism accepts 
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that there are numerous outcomes to this value conflict, it overcomes the 
oppressive element of liberal universalism that furthers social fragmentation.  
Gray refutes RawlsÕ attempts at imposing an order of values on society, 
explaining that Ôif there are goods (and evils) that are rationally 
incommensurable, then no political authority can have good reason to impose 
any particular combination of them on any of its citizens.Õ196  Liberal 
universalist attempts at doing just that (through the prioritisation of justice 
and the basic liberties), fall back on a metaphysical view of politics, which 
perceives values as universal principles awaiting discovery.  Pluralism thus 
renders the construction of fixed theories of rights both impossible and 
undesirable since they suppress politics by removing substance from the 
values they prescribe, and disregarding the potential for alternative legitimate 
values.   
 
If, like Gray, we endorse BerlinÕs view that fixed value hierarchies are 
rendered unfeasible by the incommensurabilities and incompatibilities that 
arise, it thus follows that we must also reject the rationality that they employ 
as a means to conflict resolution.  The search for rational solutions is to be 
abandoned on two premises:  firstly, since pluralism consists of various 
conceptions of the good, there can be no single rational means of pursuing 
these, and secondly, rationalism is flawed since value-incommensurability 
renders it impossible to fix a rationally-decidable order of principles.  Gray 
advocates instead BerlinÕs notion of radical choice, which asserts that Rawlsian 
rationalism exaggerates Ôthe power of reason to classify and arrange the moral 
universe, distorts and obscures a genuine rationalism, which recognizes the 
true limits of reason and makes room for agonizing moral choices that lack 
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rational justification.Õ197  The basis for this radical choice arises from BerlinÕs 
three notions of pluralism.  The first notion rejects the idea of perfection (i.e., 
the discovery of a set of ÔuniversalÕ values), perceiving it as a vacuous 
concept.  The second notion abandons hierarchical theories of value, pointing 
to Ôgroundless and criterionless choice [as] the stuff of moral and political 
life.Õ198  Finally, the third notion acknowledges that reason is helpless in 
choosing between incommensurable pluralist values.199  As a consequence of 
this notion of pluralism, Berlin employs Ôagonistic liberalismÕ, which is based on 
the assumption that, rather than relying on any rational theory, value conflicts 
are to be resolved only through practice.  Hence, on this view, the political 
takes primacy over the theoretical.200  
 
The notion of resolving value conflict through practical and political means, as 
opposed to theoretical and rational ones, is rooted in BerlinÕs abandonment of 
perfection.  Gray explicates that Ôwhereas choice presupposes genuine rivalry 
among conflicting goods, rational will points to one, and only one course of 
action, one form of life, for the individual.Õ201  Thus RawlsÕ emphasis on 
rationality assumes that rational actors pursue a certain path of life, 
suppressing diversity for those who follow alternate routes.  This echoes the 
aforementioned universalism of RawlsÕ theories in which rationality imagines a 
path of life that all human beings should strive toward through the discovery 
of universal values.  Rejecting this notion, Berlin perceives the self as an entity 
that is invented through the choices we make.202  Gray evidently endorses this 
view; as Paul Franco asserts, ÔGray celebrates BerlinÉfor his thoroughgoing 
rejection of rationalist monism and his radical assertion of the pluralism of 
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value.Õ203  Additionally, he abandons RawlsÕ understanding of the individual as 
a fixed being, acknowledging that choices constitute the individual who is Ôa 
self-transforming species which invents a variety of natures for itself.Õ204  This 
view thereby rejects the rational pursuit of ends that RawlsÕ liberal 
universalism presupposes, promoting instead the necessity of choice to the 
freedom of the individual.  Since the individualÕs identity is constituted by his 
capacity for choice, and would thus be suppressed by restriction to a single 
rational path of life, Ôthe value of freedom derives from the limits of rational 
choice.Õ205  Hence, by abandoning the rationality of A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism, radical choice empowers individuals to employ their 
freedom in choosing amongst conflicting goods.   
 
In accordance with his employment of radical choice, Gray consequently 
rejects the fixity of RawlsÕ liberal universalism in favour of contingent 
solutions.  On this view, outcomes of political reasoning necessarily arise from 
circumstance since there is no impartial, universal standpoint.  Each decision 
in society is made by an individual whose identity is intertwined with his 
attachments and situated within a context, thus it follows that the outcome is 
specific to the historical context of the actor involved.206  This is not to say 
that agonistic liberalism never favours one value over another, or indeed one 
regime over another, it is moreover to affirm that the particular value or 
regime is favoured on a contingent basis.  Gray thus rejects liberal 
universalismÕs static nature, as demonstrated by its fixed public-private 
distinction and the manner in which toleration reaffirms the liberal hegemony.  
Indeed, he challenges how Ôany such consensus could have the fixity [Rawls] 
attributes to the principles of justice.Õ207  He asserts that, even human rights 
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are conventions that Ôcan be no once-and-for-all list of such rights, since the 
content of these evils alters with changes in human life.  That is why it makes 
sense to revise or phase out some rights, and to create new rights.Õ208  Human 
rights must adapt to the circumstances of society in order to fulfil the 
changing needs of citizens.  For example, freedom of privacy did not exist in 
Europe until the early modern period since circumstance rendered it 
unimportant to peopleÕs lives, but when media communication increased, its 
implementation became necessary.209  It is the ability to modify values 
according to the needs of citizens that ensures the political nature of society.  
Agonistic liberalism thus rejects the limitations that universalism places on 
such modifications, rejecting RawlsÕ fixed value hierarchy, usage of toleration 
to reaffirm its own hegemony and static public-private distinction in favour of 
a flexible politics that adapts to circumstance.  
 
GrayÕs post-liberalism is a convincing proposal for a less universalistic, more 
political liberalism, which prioritises radical choice over rational.  However, its 
emphasis on negative freedom reflects his failure to modify the public-private 
separation.  Chapter one of this dissertation discussed how the fixed 
separation of these two realms is both oppressive to non-liberal citizens and 
damaging to multicultural politics.  This section will seek to demonstrate how 
GrayÕs post-liberalism, based on the acknowledgment of incommensurability; 
the restoration of politics; the introduction of radical choice; and the insistence 
upon contingency, requires both positive freedom and the reworking of the 
public-private distinction. 
 
Highly suspicious of positive freedom, or Ôautonomy,Õ Berlin promotes instead 
the notion of negative freedom, a principle to which Gray is highly 
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sympathetic.  Gray asserts that in so doing, ÔBerlinÕs liberalism is akin to the 
Òpolitical liberalismÓ of the later Rawls in refusing to ground liberal practice in 
a comprehensive ideal such as that of autonomy.Õ210  This notion is explained 
through BerlinÕs belief that negative freedom is more effective at adapting to 
the diverse values and conceptions of the good within pluralist society.211  
Gray explicates that, for Berlin, negative liberty Ôpermits a far greater variety 
of forms of self-creation through choice-making.Õ212  On the contrary, both 
Berlin and Gray resist positive freedom for fear that it curtails self-creation 
since it states that freedom is only valuable when used to pursue ÔworthyÕ 
ends.  For Berlin and Gray then, the notion of positive freedom is to be 
rejected on the premise that often, values honoured by one may be 
completely insignificant to another, which consequently problematises the 
definition of ÔworthyÕ ends.  Kwame Anthony Appiah supports this contention, 
asserting that employment of positive liberty in this way Ôassign[s] us all to 
undertake a comprehensive assessment of norms and values,Õ thereby 
confusing Ôthe job description of the citizen with that of the moral theorist.Õ213  
Rather, Gray affirms that choice should be valued for choice itself, asserting 
that Ôchoice may be capricious or whimsical, perverse or unreasonable, 
quixotic or self-destructive:  it remains choice, and, as such the source of the 
value of negative freedom.Õ214  However, this is where I diverge with Gray in 
favour of the perfectionist liberalism of Joseph Raz.  Contrary to Berlinian 
claims that positive freedom restricts self-creation, Raz believes it to be a 
necessary component to the Ôvision of people controlling, to some degree, 
their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their 
lives.Õ215  He affirms that negative freedom alone is insufficient in ensuring the 
                                                
210 Gray, Berlin, p. 35. 
211 Ibid, p. 23.  
212 Gray, Berlin, p. 37. 
213 Appiah, Kwame Anthony quoted in Crowder, George, ÔTwo Concepts of Liberal PluralismÕ in 
Political Theory, 35(2): 2007, p. 129. 
214 Gray, Berlin, p. 29. 
215 Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p. 369. 
 69 
ability of citizens to make decisions.  This is demonstrated in Morality of 
Freedom through the usage of an example of a slave who is coerced and 
manipulated into making a decision.  As Raz illustrates, Ôslaves are thought to 
lack autonomy even if they enjoy a range of options which, were they free, 
would have been deemed sufficient.Õ216  This limitation of negative freedom is 
apparent in pluralist society when we consider the ability of a coerced or 
manipulated individual to exit a group.  Although negative freedom prevents 
one citizen from removing the availability of anotherÕs choices, it is evidently 
insufficient in ensuring that these choices are always accessible.  Thus, the 
negative liberty endorsed by Gray suppresses cultural diversity by failing to 
ensure the capacity for self-creation.  Furthermore, GrayÕs support of negative 
freedom seems inconsistent with his rejection of liberal neutrality.  It is 
paradoxical that he should acknowledge the conception of the good intrinsic to 
liberal values, yet he simultaneously resists positive freedom because it entails 
the imposition of a particular conception of the good.  In so doing, his post-
liberalism oppresses citizens in a similar manner to Rawlsian neutrality since it 
falsely claims not to impose a certain conception of the good.  Alternatively, I 
wish to contend that positive freedom would resonate more with GrayÕs calls 
for the abandonment of liberal neutrality.  It would also overcome the 
suppression of pluralism and enable the revival of politics.  
 
Furthermore, GrayÕs empathy with Berlinian negative freedom highlights a 
fundamental gap in his agonistic liberalism.  By emphasising the significance 
of negative freedom, Gray implicitly supports the liberal public-private 
distinction - an issue on which he remains silent - in which citizens are granted 
a private space to make decisions free from intervention.  Yet the following 
paragraphs will demonstrate how GrayÕs failure to rework this divide poses a 
significant barrier to fulfilling the aims of his theory. 
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Primarily then, Gray uses BerlinÕs value pluralism to demonstrate the 
inevitability of three forms of incommensurability, exposing liberalismÕs 
entanglement in these value conflicts.  Hence, since liberal values are neither 
impartial nor neutral and their endorsement depends on a certain conception 
of the good, we cannot separate a liberalÕs beliefs (derived from their 
conception of the good) from the liberal values they advocate.  Quite contrary 
to this, RawlsÕ public-private separation Ôpresupposes belief to be neatly 
separable from ritual practice.Õ217  Yet Gray himself shows that this is not the 
case, arguing that value conflicts arise because varying conceptions of the 
good lead to allegiance to different values.  David Owen explains his 
contention that he, like Gray, rejects the separation of the political and 
personal components of an individual, stating that ÔoneÕs substantive 
conception of the good is what is revealed in the ordered set of values which 
one argues for in the political arena.Õ218  Resultantly, Ôthe political cannot be 
restricted to a certain type of institution, or envisaged as constituting a 
specific sphere or level of society.  It must be conceived as a dimension that is 
inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological 
condition.Õ219  Therefore if GrayÕs post-liberalism is to be consistent with the 
opinion that a personÕs values are constituted by their conception of the good, 
the fixed separation between the public and private spheres must be 
reworked.                     
 
Not only does the Rawlsian division of the public and the political appear 
inconsistent with GrayÕs perspective of the liberal conception of the good, it 
also contradicts his endorsement of incommensurability as a healthy 
component of pluralist society.  Gray claims to perceive incommensurability, of 
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which liberal values are not exempt, as an example of the flourishing of 
different ways of life in pluralist society.  However, if we are to have a set 
public space governed by liberal values, isolated from alternative beliefs, how 
can the concerns of minority groups ever triumph?  Chapter one sought to 
illustrate the difficulty inherent in this by demonstrating the barrier created by 
the public-private divide concerning the extension of basic liberties to women.  
Surely, this form of liberalism Ôundermines the agonistic character of public 
cultureÉthrough the form of the public/private distinction which it 
institutes.Õ220  True diversity can only occur if the political arena is not solely 
restricted to liberal assumptions.  If other legitimate beliefs are to be ignored, 
then assimilation to liberal norms is required in the public arena, and thus 
politics is suppressed.  The post-liberalism of Gray and Berlin acknowledges 
the often incommensurable diversity of pluralist citizens, endorsing a less 
theoretical, more political version of politics.  However, they Ôprivatise 
perspectivism by tying it to a liberal distinction between public and private 
spheres, confining the plural perspectives on the good to the private 
domain.Õ221  Consequently post-liberalism depoliticises the public realm by 
requiring conflicting perspectives to be resolved privately.  William Connolly 
insists upon the blurring of the public and private distinction in accordance 
with post-liberal calls for the restoration of politics in society.  Condemning 
liberal universalist attempts at distancing liberal values from conflict, Connolly 
purports that Ôthe idea is not to rise above faith, but to forge a positive ethos 
of public engagement between alternative faiths.Õ222  Since GrayÕs post-
liberalism acknowledges the impossibility of separating liberal values from 
pluralist conflict, and resultantly rejects its claims to neutrality, then it is 
evident that Gray also endorses ConnollyÕs calls for the engagement between 
faiths.  However, Connolly argues that this necessitates the reconsideration of 
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the public-private distinction.  He explains that if post-liberalism were to 
merge the public and private divide, it would be more effective in encouraging 
pluralism.  He clarifies that in so doing, post-liberalism would see how faiths 
are expressed in public, and thus be better equipped at mediating between 
conflicting conceptions of the good.223  Hence, GrayÕs post-liberalism, which 
calls for more political reasoning, necessitates the modification of the public-
private separation in order to prevent the suppression of non-liberal beliefs, 
and instead encourage pluralism to thrive. 
 
Intertwined with promoting the political over the legal, GrayÕs post-liberalism 
also follows BerlinÕs agonistic liberalism in favouring radical choice over 
rational.  However, once again, the theoryÕs weakness is in its silence over the 
public-private distinction.  Within a public sphere governed by liberal values 
that limits all other values, how can radical choice really be achieved?  
Connolly highlights the fragmentary element of the public-private separation, 
requiring minority citizens Ôto express religious belief in the private realm and 
to participate as abstract citizens in the public.  This innocent and tolerant-
sounding definition quietly elevates modern Christians into the centerÉand 
shuffles many Muslims [and other minorities] into a minority.Õ224  Hence, 
GrayÕs respect for diversity is flawed through its failure to modify the 
affirmation and reaffirmation of liberal values in the public sphere whereby 
alternative doctrines are relegated to the private realm.  In the same way that 
freedom is oppressed (as discussed in section one), radical choice too, is in 
practice, oppressed by the prohibition of non-liberal alternatives into the 
public arena.  
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Since post-liberalismÕs public-private divide still requires citizens to privilege 
liberal principles in the public realm, GrayÕs modus vivendi of toleration equally 
fails to allow citizens the genuine capacity to pursue freely their personal 
conceptions of the good.  This contradicts GrayÕs radical choice in which 
conflict resolutions occur contextually, free of a set of fixed values.  However, 
radical choice falls prey to Rawls' fixed hierarchy of values since the fixed 
public-private distinction requires the pursuit of the liberal conception of the 
good.  Resultantly, if we are to provide citizens with extensive radical choice 
then we must do more than simply tolerate alternate values as inferior 
principles to stay in the private realm.  Instead, legitimate radical choice 
requires that alternative life forms should be considered in public decision 
making which necessitates the blurring of the public-private division.  If GrayÕs 
post-liberalism continues liberal universalismÕs tradition of dictating which 
values govern the public sphere then it will fall back on rationalism. 
 
Finally, GrayÕs post-liberalism rejects the possibility of granting universal 
authority to liberalism, instead insisting upon its contingency.  However, once 
again, it is the liberal distinction between the public and private that acts as 
an obstacle to this contingency.  Since liberal principles must be adhered to 
within the public sphere, liberal universalism and post-liberalism derive their 
power from the fact that private doctrines will only be tolerated on the 
condition that they accept liberal principles.  In this sense, the public-private 
separation renders liberal values incontestable.  Connolly alerts us to the 
difficulty here, stressing the importance of contestation.  He emphasises its 
ability to Ôunsettle such naturalized settlements, [disturb] conventional 
judgments of abnormality and expos[e] something of the contingent and 
power-laden character of these settlements.Õ225   A reworking of the public-
private distinction would allow competing notions of the good to enter into the 
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public realm and hence permit contestation.  On ConnollyÕs view, this would 
subsequently allow for the challenging of the liberal hegemony.  This is 
entirely consistent with GrayÕs portrayal of liberalism, in which he rejects the 
conception of it as a universal doctrine, but moreover perceives it as a 
contingency to be challenged.  Gray has even acknowledged the: 
  
Ô[There is an evident] tension in the agonistic liberalisms of 
Berlin and Raz, in so far as they aim to give reasons for 
according a universal or general priority over other political 
goods to their differing conceptions of freedom.  BerlinÕs 
claim that collective well-being, equality and liberty, for 
example are irreducible and incommensurable values is not 
easily reconciled with the claim he sometimes also makes 
that freedom Ð in his preferred conception of negative 
liberty Ð is to be accorded a general, though never absolute 
priority over other ultimate values.Õ226   
 
Therefore, were the public-private distinction to be reworked in favour of a 
more contingent application of these principles, GrayÕs concerns about the 
universality of these principles would be addressed.  Even if BerlinÕs negative 
liberty, for instance, were currently prioritised, the public presence of rival 
conceptions of the good would enable this to be challenged, ensuring its 
contingency and preventing it from becoming oppressive.  Additionally, 
Connolly describes the public arena not only as a forum for the contestation of 
existing values, but also as a catalyst for new possibilities which Ôare created 
by identifying traces in the other of the sensibility one identifies in oneself and 
                                                
226 Gray, EnlightenmentÕs Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, p. 141. 
 75 
locating in the self elements of the sensibility attributed to the other.Õ227  Since 
Gray endorses the concept of contingency whereby regimes and their values 
evolve alongside society, it follows that he would also endorse the potential for 
new possibilities to arise.  However, in maintaining the public and private 
spheres, GrayÕs post-liberalism restricts such evolution by preventing citizens 
from identifying with others through the contestation of their differences.  As a 
result, contingency - both in challenging current ideas and forming new ones -
is constrained by the fixed division of the public and private spheres.   
 
Consequently, it seems that GrayÕs post-liberal view of the inevitability of 
value incommensurability; the restoration of politics and radical choices; and 
the necessity of contingency, are paradoxical to the fixed public-private 
separation.  In order to allow the pursuit of various conceptions of the good; 
restore politics; overcome the suppression of non-liberals; and ensure the 
contingent nature of liberalism, it is imperative that GrayÕs post-liberalism 
rethinks the public-private divide.    
 
In sum then, GrayÕs post-liberalism is an admirable move away from liberal 
universalism.  Its inclusion of liberalism in value incommensurability, and its 
resultant abandonment of attempting to provide a neutral or universally 
acceptable set of values, offers us a much less oppressive and fragmentary 
version of liberalism.  Gray insists on the desertion of a fixed value hierarchy 
that relates to a rational path of life, in favour of a more political and radical 
engagement.  This is significant to the restoration of pluralism into society by 
reinstating substance into values and by encouraging, rather than oppressing, 
a multitude of outcomes.  Furthermore, the contingency to which Gray 
attributes key importance alleviates oppression by ensuring the contestability 
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of existing values.  Yet, the paradox in GrayÕs post-liberalism is his 
endorsement of negative freedom and his failure to rework the public-private 
separation.  GrayÕs acknowledgment of the incommensurabilities within 
liberalism and his resultant perception of it as a conception of the good, 
render a fixed public-private distinction contradictory.  A public-private 
distinction whereby belief is neatly separable from politics is inconsistent with 
GrayÕs idea of incommensurability, which views the resolution of value 
decisions to resonate with belief in a particular conception of the good.  
Consequently, if his post-liberalism is to assert that value-conflicts are 
resolved according to differing notions of the good, then he must reconsider 
the public-private separation.  His calls for a more political form of reasoning 
are similarly restricted by the relegation of beliefs to the private sphere and 
the consequent suppression of pluralism to the non-political realm.  GrayÕs 
post-liberalism can only be consistent with his demands for the restoration of 
politics if he reworks the public-private distinction.  Likewise, his emphasis on 
radical choice cannot be practiced within the separate public realm.  Just as 
the individual freedom endorsed by liberal universalism is restrictive because it 
limits its extension to liberals, radical choice cannot truly promote self-
mastery if decision making must adhere to liberal values.  Radical choice can 
only be radical if people are encouraged to bring their conceptions of the good 
into the public sphere.  Finally, GrayÕs favouring of contingency over 
universality is flawed because of the fixed public-private distinction.  It is 
impossible to contest the current dominant principles if we are to contest 
those within a sphere restricted to those very principles.  Therefore, it is 
quintessential to GrayÕs contingency that other values and principles are 
allowed into the public sphere through the renegotiation of the public-private 
distinction.  Consequently then, GrayÕs post-liberalism provides numerous 
advances which offer a less oppressive, less exclusionary and therefore less 
fragmentary system, however for this to be effective, the public-private 
 77 
separation must be modified.  The next chapter will draw on the agonism of 
William Connolly in order to consider how the public-private separation could 
be reconsidered.     
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ÔTo cross that threshold is to shake up something in the established world.  It 
is to propel a fork in political time, throwing a wrench into the established 
code of obligation, goodness, identity, justice, right, or legitimacy.Õ      
(William E. Connolly, 2010)  
 
Focusing on the work of John Gray, the second chapter demonstrated how 
post-liberal developments respond to the difficulties that arise within liberal 
universalism.  Post-liberalism requires both radical choice and contingency of 
decision-making, refuting liberal universalist attempts at ranking the relative 
worth of competing values.  Gray asserts that such value-conflict is inevitable 
within the context of a pluralist society, and that, contrary to claims of 
neutrality and universality, liberal universalism fails to stand apart from this 
conflict.  I concluded that, although post-liberal aspirations toward radical 
choice and contingent decision-making provide important recommendations 
for prevailing over oppression and exclusion, the public-private divide requires 
renegotiation in order for these to be fulfilled.  In the field of agonism, such 
renegotiation is perceived to be vital to overcoming oppression and exclusion 
in both its acknowledgement of deep pluralism, and the manner in which it 
allows for the radical choice and contingency endorsed by post-liberal 
thinkers.   
 
This chapter will focus on the work of a key agonist thinker, William Connolly 
in an attempt to demonstrate that agonismÕs public-private renegotiation could 
enhance the advancements of post-liberalism.  Firstly, I will outline ConnollyÕs 
rejection of the conventional notion of pluralism, which restricts diversity to 
the norms and assumptions of the status quo.  This is important to my project 
as it demonstrates how RawlsÕ interpretation of pluralism converts diversity 
into Otherness, suppressing pluralism and intensifying conflict and social 
fragmentation.  ConnollyÕs notion of identity will subsequently be employed to 
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demonstrate how diverse identities in society are relational, thereby 
demonstrating the necessary interdependence of citizens.  The inevitability of 
this intertwinement of identities is vital in addressing the findings of the 
previous post-liberalism chapter in which the fixed public-private separation 
was deemed as both impossible and undesirable.  I will thus discuss ConnollyÕs 
notions of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, demonstrating how 
respect and self-modification are employed to allow the contestation of 
divergent views.  This will illustrate how agonism seeks to overcome the 
oppressive nature of liberal universalism whereby comprehensive doctrines are 
relegated to the private sphere.  I will then consider ConnollyÕs 
acknowledgement of the risk involved in allowing conflicting beliefs and faiths 
to contest one another in the public realm, defending his agonism against 
charges of cultural relativism.  Finally, I will assert that the promotion of 
agonistic respect and critical responsiveness through deep pluralism and 
interdependent identities, render ConnollyÕs ethos a noble attempt at replacing 
oppression and exclusion with radical politics of contingency.  However, I will 
contend that ConnollyÕs ethos is overly optimistic in the context of rife 
fundamentalist conflict, such as that of the September 11th hijackers.  It will 
thus be suggested that his theory could be greatly enhanced by combining his 
proposal of an ethos of generosity with complementary institutions and a 
motivational narrative.  
 
I begin then, by exploring ConnollyÕs critique of the conventional pluralism 
typically employed by liberalism and his alternative proposal for a deep-
pluralism.  He claims that the boundaries of conventional pluralism restrict 
diversity to a given framework by imposing two limitations.  First, the physical 
boundaries limit pluralism to the state,228 and subsequently, the moral 
boundaries limit pluralism to the existing norms of society.  Such norms are 
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restricted by a whole set of assumptions about gender difference, rights, 
economy, justice, reason, identity and nature, amongst others.229  The 
assumptions and norms that create and uphold this boundary are highly 
evident in pluralist British society, as demonstrated by the rights granted to 
same-sex couples.  As previously mentioned, the recent introduction of the 
civil partnership allows gay couples similar rights and responsibilities as those 
granted to heterosexual couples through marriage, yet same-sex marriage 
remains illegal.  This is a clear example of how conventional pluralism 
embraces diversity (through the legalisation of civil partnerships and thus the 
extension of partnership rights to same-sex couples), but ensures that this 
operates within the realms of the current status quo (in spite of granting the 
same legal consequences, a civil partnership must remain a separate entity 
from marriage).  This parallels GrayÕs critique of liberal toleration whereby 
minorities are tolerated in spite of their differences, and are only tolerated on 
the condition that they adhere to and reaffirm liberal principles.  Connolly thus 
highlights the limited nature of such pluralism, asserting that these narrow 
boundaries of pluralism set Ôstringent limits of reasonableness within which 
new claims to diversification are judged.Õ230  This reminds us of chapter one in 
which RawlsÕ usage of the ÔrationalÕ and the ÔreasonableÕ attaches a 
universalistic superiority to liberal values, restricting society to what the liberal 
hegemony perceives to be reasonable.  Instead of providing a diverse society 
then, conventional pluralism restricts variety to those whose paths of life are 
compatible with liberalism, oppressing difference by converting it into 
Otherness.  Connolly highlights how attempts at oppressing alternate faiths 
can increase conflict and violence, describing conventional pluralism as 
Ôhaunted by the ghosts it seeks to exorcise.Õ231  Connolly thereby perceives 
one aspect of liberal oppression and exclusion to arise from the narrow walls 
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of norms and assumptions to which pluralism is confined.  He calls, instead, 
for a ÔdeeperÕ pluralism, which accounts for faiths that operate outside of the 
status quo.  This deep pluralism requires that Ôdemocracy must not be 
governed too tightly by a prior set of moral principles, constitutional rules, 
corporate dictates, or normative codes.Õ232  This notion consequently supports 
GrayÕs critique of RawlsÕ fixed value hierarchy in which he rejects rational 
choice in favour of radical choice and contingency.  Yet ConnollyÕs 
interpretation of deep pluralism diverges from GrayÕs in its renegotiation of the 
fixity of the public-private divide.  He asserts that deep pluralism requires 
minorities to bring dimensions of their faith into the public arena in order to 
Ôreinstate the link between practice and belief that has been artificially severed 
by secularism.Õ233  This is contrary to RawlsÕ attempts at relegating faith to the 
private sphere in an aspiration toward reducing pluralist conflict.  ConnollyÕs 
deep pluralism thus seeks to overcome the oppression of liberal universalism 
by challenging the narrowness of its rules and norms, and by encouraging 
minorities to bring their faiths into the public realm.  This enables his deep 
pluralism to overcome the exclusion that aggravates social fragmentation and 
conflict. 
 
Just as conventional pluralism converts difference into Otherness by restricting 
diversity to the realm of liberal reason, individual faiths also have the potential 
to suppress pluralism and further fragment society through ÔfundamentalismÕ 
or Ômadness in faith.Õ234  Connolly describes fundamentalism as the grounding 
of a belief in an absolute authority, whereby those that diverge from this belief 
is converted into a negative Other: 
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Ô[Fundamentalism is] an overweening drive to assert:  ÒWhat I am 
(believe, demand, pray, do) is what morality (God, nature, 
reason, science) itself requires; and anything (person, creed, 
nation, movement) deviating from these exclusive imperatives is 
an other to be converted or conquered or bothÓ.Õ235   
 
For instance, the terrorists involved in the September 11th attacks were 
constituted of a group of individuals who perceived their identity as Islamic 
extremists to be what Allah and the Quran require, interpreting the decline of 
faith in the West as an immorality, requiring elimination of the Ôinfidel.Õ  
Connolly explains that this threat of fundamentalism arises when one faith 
perceives the identity of another as a danger to its expression, or even 
existence.  This threat arises as a result of the interdependence of identities in 
which each individual is defined by the very element of his identity that 
distinguishes him from others.236  Subsequently, when the different values 
intrinsic to these identities conflict with one another, identity Ôconverts 
difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.Õ237  
Returning to the above example, an Islamic extremist may perceive Western 
atheism as a threat to the significance of Islamic cultural and communal 
values.  Connolly explains that Ôthe publication of those alternative faiths, 
needed for the specification of yours, can also threaten self-confidence that 
your faith expresses the essence of being.  It is inside this double constitution 
of faith itself that the problem of evil within faith is insinuated.Õ238  The drive to 
simultaneously reassert oneÕs own faith as an absolute, whilst transforming 
diversity into a negative Other, leads to resentment and the desire to 
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eradicate difference.  This tendency to negate difference endangers pluralist 
society with an increased threat of conflict and social fragmentation.   
 
Connolly explains that such Ômadness in faithÕ239 does not just arise from the 
threat that the Other poses to oneÕs own identity.  This resentment also 
evolves when a faith holds a set of values that are odds with those that 
society claim to be universal.240  Just as an Islamic extremist fails to challenge 
his own interpretation of divinity, nature and sin when considering atheism, 
universalistic theories, such as RawlsÕ, equally fail to contest their own 
interpretations of justice, toleration and individual freedom.  This can 
resultantly cause resentment from sectors of society who do not agree that 
such liberal values are universal.  Connolly affirms that the relegation of faith 
to the private sphere can cause social fragmentation in this way, since 
Ôsecularists themselves very often have inordinate faith in the self-sufficiency 
of the public procedures they endorse.Õ241  Hence, RawlsÕ aspirations of 
providing a neutral public sphere aside from religious conflict can actually 
increase fundamentalist fervour by remaining ignorant to the contestability of 
his own liberal ideals, thereby excluding and marginalising minorities.  
Connolly explains this further with reference to both the legal and rational 
components of A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.  He asserts that 
they Ôsilently take [their] own fundamental identity to be the source that must 
guide moral life in generalÉ[and] insist that [their] identity is anchored in an 
intrinsic Purpose or Law or potential consensus that can be known to be 
true.Õ242  Resultantly, by preventing the contestation of its values by grounding 
them in laws and consensuses, RawlsÕ liberal universalism has the potential to 
increase fundamentalism, aggravating minorities who feel excluded and 
marginalised.  Connolly thus echoes GrayÕs belief that liberal universalist 
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attempts at constructing laws and consensuses in order to regulate values can 
actually intensify fundamentalist conflict rather than mediating it.  His agonism 
thereby supports GrayÕs post-liberal demands for a contingent decision-
making procedure in which each doctrine acknowledges the contestable nature 
of its conception of the good, affirming contingent, radical choice over 
incontestable laws or consensuses.   
 
Connolly perceives contestability to be necessary to overcoming the 
oppression and social fragmentation of liberal universalism in two ways.  
Primarily, when one acknowledges the contestability of his own doctrine, the 
threat that this identity poses to the identity of another is significantly 
reduced.  Thus if RawlsÕ liberal universalism were to follow post-liberal calls for 
the abandonment of neutrality and universality then it would reduce the threat 
it poses to the identity of non-liberals.  Additionally, when society 
acknowledges the contestability of its dominant values and beliefs (such as 
those endorsed by RawlsÕ liberal universalism), less oppression is inflicted on 
those that do not share such ideals.  Connolly arrives at these two conclusions 
from the influence that he draws from the works of both Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida.  In Man and His Doubles, Foucault emphasises the relational 
and collective element of identity, whereby each identity in society is 
necessarily interconnected with conflicting others.  He illustrates this with the 
example of the painting of Las Meninas in which Ôall the interior lines of the 
painting, and above all those that come from the central reflection, point 
towards the very thing that is represented, but absent.Õ243  Thus, by 
demonstrating the paintingÕs ability to convey the meaning of one absent idea 
through related ideas, Foucault shows how concepts are interconnected, in 
which we can enrich our knowledge of one concept by understanding another.  
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Connolly emphasises the necessity of such relationality and collectivity, 
providing us with an example of an instance in which oneÕs understanding of a 
value requires access to other related concepts: 
 
ÔIf a person did not understand the concept of honesty, he might, 
if he wanted money, simply take it from a purse left open.  We 
could not correctly say that he acted dishonestlyÉ  For the 
concepts of honesty, advice, and politeness must be available to 
the agents themselves before they can be said to act in these 
ways.  If our simple person came later to understand the concept 
of honesty, he would now confront decisions not available to him 
before.Õ244   
 
Thus, as both Foucault and ConnollyÕs example suggest, it is the very 
existence of alternate concepts that renders one concept meaningful.  Derrida 
asserts that Ôdiffrance is what makes the movement of signification possible 
only if each so-called ÒpresentÓ elementÉis related to something other than 
itself.Õ245  Hence, the significance of one identity is derived from the relation it 
has to other identities.  Contrary to RawlsÕ attempts at isolating the liberal 
public sphere from the non-liberal private sphere, Connolly draws on 
Derridean diffrance to falsify the possibility that concepts can exist in a 
vacuum.  He affirms that Ôclarification of the concept of politics thereby 
involves the elaboration of the broader conceptual system within which it is 
implicated.Õ246  Foucault explains that the necessary relationality and 
collectivity of identity is not restricted to terms that complement one another, 
but also extends to those that conflict with one another.  He illustrates this 
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with the example of nature and human nature, which he deems to be 
opposites:  
 
ÔDespite this opposition, however, or rather, through it, we see 
the positive relation of nature to human nature beginning to take 
shape.  They act, in fact, upon identical elementsÉboth reveal 
against the background of an uninterrupted fabric the possibility 
of a general analysis which makes possible the distribution of 
isolable identities and visible differences over a tabulated space 
and in an ordered sequence.  But they cannot succeed in doing 
this without each other, and it is there that the communication 
between them occurs.Õ247  
 
Connolly too, extends the relational and collective nature of identity to notions 
that conflict, which is important since, as Gray articulates, pluralist society is 
rife with conflicting identities that may be incommensurable and/or 
incompatible with one another.  Indeed, it is the clash of these identities that 
causes the very fundamentalist conflict that Rawls, Gray and Connolly seek to 
mediate.  Connolly affirms that his personal identity as a white, male, 
American, sports fan, Ôis further specified by comparison to a variety of thing I 
am not.Õ248  This is evident if we turn to pluralist society since, for instance, 
pro-choice abortion campaigners are defined by the values and beliefs that 
distinguish them from pro-life campaigners; homosexuals from the manner in 
which their relations diverge from those of heterosexuals; and religious groups 
from the elements of alternate faiths that they reject.    
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Connolly concludes that since every identity is reliant upon the existence of 
others, Ôno positive identity can be judged final in a world where identities are 
organized through the differences they regulate.Õ249  On the contrary, to 
pursue a single identity whilst eliminating all alternatives is to Ôbe false to 
difference.Õ250  RawlsÕ liberal universalist doctrine - which maintains the 
dominance of its own identity by rendering itself incontestable, and by 
eliminating difference from the public sphere Ð thereby oppresses society in 
two ways.  Primarily, since the liberal identity is incomplete when isolated 
from the different identities of alternate doctrines, the values of RawlsÕ liberal 
public sphere lack substance, oppressing politics.  Additionally, the relegation 
of difference to the private sphere suppresses diversity and pluralism.  Thus 
Connolly explains that, contrary to the liberal hegemony intrinsic to RawlsÕ 
public sphere, one must forgo the pursuit of a single identity in order to be 
true to difference.251  In so doing, Connolly emphasises the importance of 
publicly engaging with those alternate others to whom we are necessarily 
interlinked.  He explains that by focusing on our differences, politics 
acknowledges the Ôindispensability of identity to life, disturbs the 
dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human 
life into the strife and interdependence of identity\ difference.Õ252  Thus, it is 
through such engagement that we are able to overcome the liberal universalist 
hegemony; revive substance to public values; and encourage diversity.   
 
ConnollyÕs interpretation of identity, in which each one necessarily engages 
with alternative  others, demonstrates a different definition of identity to those 
reflected in both RawlsÕ and GrayÕs public-private distinctions.  According to 
ConnollyÕs agonistic perception of identity Ôit is impossible to become detached 
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entirely from identities coursing through us; for we float, swim, and sink in the 
pool of normality and abnormality in which we are set.Õ253  This standpoint is 
quite contrary to the theories of both Rawls and Gray, which require each 
citizen to detach himself from his private attachments before entering the 
public sphere.  This static public-private distinction supports the assumption in 
the first chapter in which oneÕs attachments are not essential to their 
existence, making it possible to dress oneself in oneÕs attachments, removing 
them when necessary.254  ConnollyÕs agonism alternatively perceives 
attachments as necessary components in constituting the identity of both the 
individual and his relational other.  Thus, it follows that on ConnollyÕs view of 
identity, a non-liberal citizen cannot exist in isolation from his beliefs, and a 
liberal citizen cannot exist without his relational Other.  As Connolly asserts, 
this renders impossible the liberal relegation of faith to the private sphere 
because Ôif difference requires identity and identity requires difference, then 
politics, in some sense of that protean word, pervades social life.Õ255  Since 
identity is relational and interdependent, it is thereby evident that the beliefs 
of citizens cannot exist in isolation to one another and the fixed public-private 
divide between liberal and non-liberal attachments must be reworked.  
 
Not only is it impossible, in ConnollyÕs view, to ban identity/difference relations 
from the public sphere of the political, it is also undesirable for two reasons.  
This prohibition of non-liberal values in RawlsÕ public sphere primarily creates 
a barrier to GrayÕs radical choice and contingency, and subsequently, displays 
a public consensus which is biased in favour of the current dominant 
hegemony.  As a result of the fixed public-private distinction, hegemonic 
groups such as liberals, lend Ôlegitimacy to their initiatives and veto power 
while diminishing it for groups which might otherwise seek to challenge 
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prevailing practices.Õ256  Indeed, Connolly informs us that pluralism does not 
frequently triumph when cases of difference arise in the public sphere.257  
Evidently then, the prevalence of pluralism through radical choice is often 
restricted, frequently falling prey instead to the rational choice of the current 
hegemony.  In addition to limiting radical choice, the separate public sphere 
also curtails the contingency that Gray calls for.  By prioritising dominant 
values and beliefs, the public-private distinction Ômisrecognizes new 
possibilities of diversification by freezing moral standards of judgment 
condensed from past political struggles.Õ258  In order to overcome the 
oppression invoked by Rawls' liberal universalism then, Ôthe connections 
between personal and collective identity must be engaged overtly and 
politically if they are not to spawn a collective politics that unconsciously 
represses difference in the name of neutrality.Õ259  Hence, it is in the public 
engagement of belief systems that oppression is overcome by challenging the 
current hegemony and reviving politics through emphasising the necessity of 
difference.  His agonism thus reworks the public-private divide to ensure that 
it consists of Ôa preliminary readiness to negotiate with presumptive generosity 
and forbearance in those numerous situations where recourse to the porous 
rules of commonality across faiths, public procedure, reason, or deliberation 
are insufficient to the issue at hand.Õ260   
 
ConnollyÕs definition of identity thereby suggests that pluralist society requires 
both acknowledgment of the contestability of conflicting doctrines and the 
renegotiation of the public-private separation.  In renegotiating the public-
private divide to ensure contestability, Connolly firstly develops the notion of 
Agonistic Respect in which Ôwe opponents can become bonded together, 
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partially and contingently, through an enhanced experience of the 
contestability of the problematic each pursues most fervently.Õ261  ConnollyÕs 
notion of agonistic respect draws on a post-Nietzschean ethical sensibility.  
This sensibility aspires initially, to expose the pretence by which dominant 
hegemonies secure their self-certainty; secondly, to challenge the hegemonic 
moralities; thirdly, to create a Ôpathos of distanceÕ in which the contestability 
of each position is acknowledged; and finally, to contest those that suppress 
the constructed, contingent, relational nature of identity.262  Fundamental to 
my project is ConnollyÕs employment of the pathos of distance which asserts 
that participation in the public arena requires each identity to acknowledge the 
contestability of its own ideals.  Connolly affirms that whilst the individual 
continues to affirm his beliefs, it is necessary to Ôcome to terms viscerally and 
positively with the extent to which it must appear profoundly contestable to 
others inducted into different practices, exposed to different events, and 
pulled by different calls to loyalty.Õ263  Connolly explains that contestability 
Ôinserts relational modesty into its ritual practices to amplify one side of its 
own faith Ð the injunction to practice hospitality toward other faiths coexisting 
with it Ð and to curtail pressures within it to repress and marginalize other 
faiths.Õ 264  ConnollyÕs focus on contestability thus aspires to reduce the 
repression and marginalisation that fundamentalism aggravates by claiming 
one belief as superior and negating all alternatives as a result.  In addition to 
reducing the effects of fundamentalism, the contestability intrinsic to agonistic 
respect also seeks to resist the violence that can arise when values are 
imposed under the guise of universalism.  When liberal universalism presents 
individual freedom, for instance, as neutral and universal, social fragmentation 
is aggravated by oppressing and excluding those who give precedence to 
alternate values.  Yet, when liberalism accepts the contestability of individual 
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freedom, citizens honouring alternate values are encouraged to challenge it, 
thereby including them in engagement, resultantly preventing the oppressive 
nature of liberal universalist marginalisation.  Thus it is evident that ConnollyÕs 
notion of contestability draws on GrayÕs demands for liberal universalism to 
abandon its claims to neutrality and universality.  However, agonism builds on 
these post-liberal demands by ensuring that liberal values are contested 
politically in public engagement.  Connolly illustrates that through 
contestability, Ôyou sacrifice the demand for the unquestioned hegemony of 
your faith to curtail the occasions when its very defense calls upon you to 
impose otherwise unnecessary violence or suffering on others.Õ265  The 
significance of this contestability is manifest in the historical dominance of 
heterosexual relationships that allowed violence and suffering to be inflicted 
on homosexuals in the name of universalism.  It was only when the superior 
status of heterosexuals became contestable that violence and suffering was 
reduced.  Therefore, by acknowledging the contestability of oneÕs own beliefs 
in this way, public contestation overcomes the repression, marginalisation, 
and violence that is justified by granting an incontestable universal status to 
values.  It is thereby evident how the contestability and contingency endorsed 
in ConnollyÕs decision-making can overcome the oppressive, exclusionary 
nature of RawlsÕ neutral and universal consensuses.    
 
In addition to his aim of preventing repression and violence, Connolly aspires, 
through agonistic respect, to cultivate positive relationships between 
contending identities.  This idea is derived from FoucaultÕs notion of analytic 
finitude, which Ôis always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, 
is also the Near and the Same.Õ266  Connolly refers to this concept as 
imperative to the negotiation of Ôoblique connections across multiple lines of 
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difference, negotiating agonistic respect between constituencies who embrace 
different final faiths and do not comprehend each other all that well.Õ267  It is 
thus by acknowledging the contestability of our beliefs Ð and, consequently, 
forming connections with the Other - that violent conflicts can be transformed 
into positive, diverse relationships.  Connolly explains that this connection is 
formed by employing the notion of contestability, allowing the individual to 
demonstrate his own doubts and uncertainties in his position to the Other.  
Connolly asserts that citizens Ôconnect positively through reciprocal confession 
that those in each group confront doubts, forgetfulness, or uncertainties in 
themselves that may invert those confronted by others.Õ268  In this manner, an 
affinity is formed with the Other.  For example, it has previously been affirmed 
that, frequently, both those endorsing the wearing of the burkha and those 
favouring its prohibition all advocate freedom of expression, but they perceive 
it from divergent standpoints; respectively that of the religious community and 
that of the individual.  Perhaps if the opposing groups were to employ 
agonistic respect and demonstrate awareness of the contestability of their 
interpretation of freedom of expression, then the two sides could overcome 
their resentment toward one another.  As Connolly states, Ôthey can evolve 
into reciprocal commitment to inject generosity and forbearance into public 
negotiations between parties who reciprocally acknowledge that the deepest 
wellsprings of human inspiration are to date susceptible to multiple 
interpretations.Õ269  This generosity and forbearance, from the standpoint of 
ConnollyÕs agonism, is constituted by accepting the contestability of oneÕs own 
identity in favour of offering the other Ôopacity.Õ270  It is also significant that, 
for Connolly, acknowledgement of contestability does not lead to a decline in 
oneÕs loyalty toward it.  So, if those advocating the prohibition of the burkha 
were to acknowledge the contestability of their individual interpretation of 
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freedom of expression, they would in no way be required to adapt their 
interpretation to the communal alternative.  Moreover, as Connolly explains, 
Ôthere is no contradiction in first affirming the essential contestability of a 
concept and then making the strongest case available for one of the positions 
within that range.  ThatÕs politics.Õ271   
 
In reference to the relationship between agonistic respect and liberal 
toleration, Connolly asserts that they Ôare kissing cousins, but they are not 
equivalent.Õ272  Connolly echoes GrayÕs critique of liberal toleration as a tool by 
which minorities are tolerated as inferior others who must adhere to liberal 
norms, thereby reasserting the liberal hegemony.  He demonstrates the power 
relations inherent in such toleration, stating that Ôliberal tolerance is bestowed 
upon private minorities by a putative majority occupying the authoritative, 
public centerÉ  People seldom enjoy being tolerated that much, since it carries 
the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes its 
own position to be beyond question.Õ273  Thus the perception of liberal 
toleration, whereby an inferior minority relies upon a dominant majority, 
oppresses and marginalises minority groups.  ConnollyÕs notion of agonistic 
respect challenges this power relation by employing an alternative 
understanding of identity.  On this interpretation, each identity in pluralist 
society is both dependent upon and is essential to, the existence of all others.  
This is quite contrary to the liberal interpretation in which the toleration of 
minorities relies on acceptance and reaffirmation of majority principles for, 
whilst the majority employs its superior position to decide which minorities 
should exist.  Connolly thus distinguishes agonistic respect from liberal 
toleration by Ôaffirming a more ambiguous relation of interdependence and 
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strife between identities over a passing letting the other be.Õ274  Rather than 
seeking a dominant consensus in which minorities are tolerated as deviants 
from the mainstream then, Ôagonistic respect ÒcutsÓ deeper than tolerance 
because it folds contestation into the foundations of the putative identity from 
which liberal tolerance is often derived and delimited.Õ275  In this manner, 
ConnollyÕs notion of agonistic respect allows his theory to advance GrayÕs 
critique of toleration by overcoming the oppression highlighted by his modus 
vivendi.  In so doing, Connolly employs his interpretation of identity to 
demonstrate how all components of society are necessarily bound to one 
another.  This consequently forms a more ambiguous power relation in which 
each component of society must respect the others, ensuring that no superior, 
dominant group merely tolerates the inferior minority. 
 
Since ConnollyÕs agonistic respect differs from toleration because each identity 
Ð including that of the dominant liberal universalism - is entangled in the 
identity\difference relation, it follows that agonistic respect seeks to challenge 
dominant codes of morality.  Drawing on FoucaultÕs ethical sensibility, 
Connolly endorses the need to subject current moralities to public Ôstrip 
searchesÕ276 through his agonistic respect.  Connolly explains the necessity of 
ensuring that current dominant values, such as those employed by Rawls, are 
included in this public contestation.  He explains that this prevents the 
conversion of difference into Otherness; abandons the search for a single 
identity; and, finally, allows for the evolution of relational possibilities between 
competing interlinked identities.277  In this way, agonistic respect seeks to 
both encourage pluralism and overcome the marginalisation of minority 
groups in RawlsÕ society by including them in public engagement, rather than 
excluding and negating them.  It additionally enriches politics by ensuring that 
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a diversity of views are contested publicly, rather than simply restricting the 
public sphere to the dominant liberal principles as in the theories of Rawls and 
Gray.  Finally, contrary to RawlsÕ liberal universalism Ð which automatically 
reaffirms its values through toleration and a separate public realm - agonistic 
respect allows new possibilities to arise through the contestation of current 
beliefs.  Thus, agonistic respect aspires to ensure that the public ethos 
replaces resentment with contestation; overcomes repression; reduces 
violence; encourages forbearance and generosity; challenges current 
moralities; and allows for the emergence of new identities.   
 
In addition to agonistic respect, ConnollyÕs ethos of engagement also requires 
citizens to practice the notion of Critical Responsiveness toward one another.  
This notion parallels agonistic respect by calling for citizens to be receptive to 
other values; rejecting dependence on fixed moral codes; and insisting upon 
the continuous challenging of existing norms.  It diverges from agonistic 
respect, however, by concerning itself not just with pluralism, but also with 
new drives of pluralisation.278  Critical responsiveness advocates self-
modification encouraging society to challenge the gut feelings engrained into 
their identities; reconsider the concepts they take for granted; and work on 
the way in which those gut feelings affect their understandings of such 
concepts: 
 
Ô[Critical responsiveness requires the individual to be] more 
open to responsive engagement with alternative faiths, 
sensualities, gender practices, ethnicities, and so on.  Doing so 
to render yourself better able to listen to new and surprising 
movements in the politics of becoming without encasing them 
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immediately in preset judgments that sanctify the universality 
or naturalness of what you already are.Õ279   
 
This employment of self-modification encourages the contestation of existing 
codes, allowing for the evolution of new ones.280  In encouraging pluralisation 
through critical responsiveness in this way, ConnollyÕs ethos aspires to both 
overcome the exclusionary, oppressive nature of fixed liberal values, and to 
revive the diversity and deep pluralism that has been suppressed. 
 
Connolly highlights the necessity of pluralisation to his ethos of engagement 
through his critique of RawlsÕ fixed system of values.  He informs us that 
ÔRawls wants to freeze the liberal conception of the person and the secular 
conception of public space today, while everything else in and around the 
culture undergoes change.Õ281  Rawls does respond to similar charges in An 
Introduction to Political Liberalism by claiming to perceive the bounds of 
reasonableness as evolving over time, expecting the rational consensus to 
alter slowly as a result.282  However, I wish to endorse ConnollyÕs critique, 
viewing RawlsÕ aforementioned fixed value hierarchy; liberal public sphere; 
toleration; claims to neutrality; and universalistic terminology such as 
ÔrationalityÕ and Ôreasonableness,Õ as barriers to modification.  Connolly informs 
us that this aim of freezing current values and norms constitutes a further 
attempt at reaffirming liberal dominance, asserting that Rawls ÔwantsÉpersons 
and the generic facts about them to remain stationary so that liberal justice 
can be (nearly) sufficient unto itself.Õ283  However, ConnollyÕs deep pluralism 
illustrates that this occurs at the detriment of pluralism, informing us that Ôit is 
even more important to remember that things donÕt stay still.  Even the 
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dense, unconscious coding of personhood shifts over time.Õ284  Since its 
context is ever-changing then, it is evident that RawlsÕ liberal universalism 
suppresses pluralism by restricting future morality to current norms.  In order 
to overcome both the exclusion of minorities and the stifling of diversity that 
ensue from a politics such as RawlsÕ, ConnollyÕs critical responsiveness thus 
recommends that we Ôcultivate sensitivity to new circumstances and social 
movements that suggest the possible need to change entrenched habits.Õ285  
Aletta Norval asserts the necessity of pluralisation to Ôexisting Western 
democracies that find the normative and institutional frameworks in which 
their conceptions of democracy are rooted being questioned.Õ286  The 
revolutionary introduction of womenÕs voting rights in 1918, for instance, 
demonstrates how displaying this very sensitivity toward womenÕs rights 
movements led to acknowledgement of the need to modify the frameworkÕs 
engrained norms and assumptions about the two sexes.  Hence, in order for 
pluralisation to overcome current marginalisations and exclusions, critical 
responsiveness is necessary to Ôshake up something in the established worldÉ  
To propel a fork in political time, throw a wrench into the established code of 
obligation, goodness, identity, justice, right, or legitimacy.Õ287   
 
In addition to its aspirations of overcoming the exclusion and oppression 
inflicted by entrenched norms, critical responsiveness also seeks to prevent 
the suppression of diversity.  Connolly recalls the history of ill-treatment 
toward slaves, atheists and homosexuals, amongst others, in the West in 
order to illustrate how resistance to change has resulted in wide-spread 
suffering.288  The suffering inflicted on these groups highlights how the 
diversity of social groups, faiths and sexualities has been historically 
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suppressed as a result of the refusal to alter embedded norms and values.  
Connolly illustrates that it was the very modification of these norms and 
values that exposed them to be unjust.289  Thus, Connolly explains that it is 
through challenging current norms and employing sensitivity toward new ones 
through critical responsiveness that pluralisation revives diversity.  He asserts 
that this will Ômake us alert to the late-modern politics of diversification, by 
which new rights, identities, and goods periodically push themselves into 
being, disrupting fixed conceptions of divinity, justice, faith, rights, identity, 
and the good.Õ290  Thus, rather than suppressing diversity to fit neatly into the 
existing codes of morality, critical responsiveness modifies the codes of 
morality to adapt to the current diversity.  This revives the diversity that 
RawlsÕ liberal universalism suppresses by ensuring that values are dictated by 
circumstance, and not vice-versa.  In this manner, critical responsiveness 
focuses on pluralisation in which diversity is constantly evolving: 
 
ÔNew and unforeseen things surge into being, such as a new and 
surprising religious faith, a new source of moral inspiration, a new 
mode of civilizational warfare, a new cultural identity unsettling an 
existing constellation of established identities, a new collective 
good, or the placement of the new right on the existing register of 
recognized rights.Õ291   
 
Hence, it is through the ability of critical responsiveness to both challenge 
current exclusionary norms and to revive diversity that new drives to 
pluralisation arise, deepening pluralism as a result. 
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In addition to cultivating critical responsiveness in order to increase 
appreciation of diverse others, Connolly also offers critical responsiveness as 
an expansion of liberal toleration.  As suggested through agonistic respect, 
Connolly appears to share GrayÕs critique of liberal toleration as a vehicle used 
simultaneously to reassert the dominant position of the tolerator and the 
weaker position of the tolerated.  The notion of critical responsiveness seeks 
to destabilise further the relations disrupted by the ambiguous identity 
relationship of agonistic respect.  Connolly asserts that the establishment of a 
static liberal identity allows toleration to emanate from those at the 
mainstream centre of society towards those on the margins.  However, critical 
responsiveness contests the stability of the dominant identity, challenging the 
centrality of its power as a result.292  As Connolly states, Ôwhere tolerance 
implies benevolence toward others amid stability of ourselves, critical 
responsiveness involves active work on our current identities in order to 
modify the terms of relation between us and them.Õ293  In order to explain how 
this occurs, we must consider both the changing and relational nature of 
identity in which an individual is defined by what they are not.  Since every 
identity is bound to multiple others, it hence follows that when one identity 
changes, so too does another.  Here, Connolly expands upon BerlinÕs 
explanation (in chapter two) of the individualÕs identity as constituted by the 
choices he makes, asserting moreover that oneÕs identity is not simply self-
transforming, but also evolves through the fluidity of alternate identities. This 
can be explained through the manner in which the emergence of womenÕs 
rights movements required the modification of the male identity.  Just as men 
had to alter their perspective of women as secondary citizens, they were also 
required to modify the status of their own hegemonic identity by abandoning 
its claims to the embodiment of normality, universality, or superiority.  This is 
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evidently quite contrary to the static nature of liberal toleration, in which 
Rawls Ôacts as if his own identity (as Òa personÓ) can remain untouched and 
unchanged as he responds to new and surprising movements of differenceÕ294.  
Rather, ConnollyÕs relational understanding of identity suggests that critical 
responsiveness requires the continuous renegotiation of oneÕs own identity 
and the subsequent fluidity of politics.  For Connolly, as in GrayÕs radical 
politics, such identity renegotiation and its subsequent political contingency, 
termed by him as Ôthe politics of becoming,Õ295 is vital to pluralisation.  
 
Since public engagement in agonistic respect and critical responsiveness 
requires the radical choice and contingency that GrayÕs post-liberalism 
necessitates, one of the most frequent criticisms charged against ConnollyÕs 
work is cultural relativism.  However, I seek to defend these criticisms before 
highlighting what I perceive to be much more serious problems.  In Pluralism, 
Connolly shows these charges to be false in three ways:  by highlighting, 
firstly, the non-concentric nature of his interpretation of identity; secondly, 
that the abandonment of absolute standards in his work does not signify the 
abandonment of all standards; and, finally, the necessity of risk of an ethos of 
responsiveness in defending against the danger posed by unitarianism.  
Firstly, then, Connolly defines cultural relativism as Ôthe view that you should 
support the culture that is dominant in a particular place.Õ296  As a result, he 
clarifies that relativism is usually contextualised by a concentric view of culture 
in which each culture is isolated territorially.  Thus the culture is said Ôto 
radiate from the family to larger circles such as neighborhood, locality, and 
nation.  The largest circles of belonging in turn radiate back to the smaller 
ones, with each circle entering into relations of resonance with the others.Õ297  
As a result, Connolly demonstrates how a cultural relativist would actually 
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endorse the dominant beliefs of each particular territory.  However, Connolly 
insists that such an interpretation of culture is incompatible with his deep 
pluralism which, quite contrary to reducing culture to isolated territories, is 
Ôalso alert to eccentric connections that cut across the circles of family, 
neighborhood, and nation.Õ298  This is evident in ConnollyÕs consideration of 
religious fundamentalists; gay rights advocates; and abortion campaigners, 
none of whom are confined to a given territory.  Indeed, Connolly remarks 
that it is more likely that universalists with their Ôflat pluralismÕ will perceive 
culture from a concentric standpoint.299 
 
Subsequently, Connolly stresses that the abandonment of absolute standards 
does not allow politics to decline into no standards at all.  He affirms that 
Ôpluralism, particularly of the multidimensional, embedded variety supported 
here, requires a set of civic virtues to support itself,Õ300 but, similar to the 
contingent radical politics of GrayÕs post-liberalism, his ethos rejects that these 
virtues require the fixity that RawlsÕ value hierarchy relies upon.  
Consequently, ConnollyÕs agonism, with its foundations of respect and self-
modification, seeks to establish an ethos in which to cultivate contingent 
standards, rather than simply to abolish all standards.  He clarifies that, 
through such an ethos, Ôour image of culture encourages us to embrace 
certain things in this particular place, to be indifferent to some, to be wary of 
others, and to fight militantly against the continuation of yet others.Õ301  Thus, 
ConnollyÕs thesis is based, not on the withdrawal of all standards, but the 
employment of general, contestable standards which replace the fixed 
standards imposed by RawlsÕ liberal universalism.  As Connolly concludes, Ôit is 
thus necessary to set limits, but pluralists are critical of the self-confidence 
with which many unitarians endow already existing limits with eternal 
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necessity.Õ302  Henceforth, ConnollyÕs theory does not decline into relativism 
and the abolishment of all standards. 
 
Connolly is aware of the risk involved with regards to the values which might 
arise as a result of employing contestable standards.  However, Connolly 
measures the uncertainties and ambiguities that accompany agonism against 
the threat posed by unitarianism, resultantly concluding that this risk is 
unavoidable.  He once again highlights Western societiesÕ history of ill-
treatment toward non-Christians; women; homosexuals; mixed-race couples; 
and unmarried politicians, employing these examples to demonstrate how 
unitarianismÕs application of fixed standards has resulted in severe 
suffering.303  Connolly perceives this implementation of fixed standards, such 
as those employed by liberal universalism, as Ôpre-emptive strikes against 
difference.Õ304  In ConnollyÕs view, it is thereby imperative to replace these 
standards with general, contingent virtues in order to overcome the 
oppression of minorities and the suppression of diversity that results from the 
imposition of a single hegemonic identity.305  Furthermore, Connolly suggests 
that when societies acknowledge the inherent risk of employing contestability, 
his ethos could actually be enhanced by reminding citizens of the importance 
of practicing generosity through agonistic respect and critical responsiveness: 
 
Ô[This risk] reminds us how ethical uncertainty haunts the 
politics of becoming and how important it is to those who care 
for the plurivocity of being Ð or who come to a similar sentiment 
from different directions Ð to cultivate an ethos of critical 
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responsiveness irreducible to a fixed moral code or abstract 
conception of the person.Õ306      
 
Although as David Howarth observes, ConnollyÕs agonism briefly discusses the 
requirement of political dimensions in his ethos (micropolitics of action, politics 
of disturbance, politics of enactment, politics of representational assemblages, 
interstate relations, politics of non-statist, cross-national movements),307 his 
theory does not seek to dictate how such an ethos should be implemented in 
the political domains of society.  Rather, it aspires to provide us the Ôtools, 
resources and suggestions with which we can think and act politically.Õ308  
Connolly rejects fixed value hierarchies such as RawlsÕ, suggesting instead a 
set of civic virtues, termed the Ôpolitics of immanenceÕ, which seeks to grant 
citizens the capacity to peacefully coexist amidst their differences.309  Thus, 
rather than arising through adherence to a leader, it is Gulshan KhanÕs 
contention that for Connolly, regulation results from citizens themselves.  
Likening ConnollyÕs regulation of society to that of LockeÕs self-regulating one, 
Khan demonstrates how citizens in ConnollyÕs ethos regulate themselves 
through the interconnectedness of their identities.  She explains that, for 
Connolly, it is the paradoxical tension between the agonism of publicly 
affirming oneÕs own beliefs and the respect of simultaneously listening to and 
responding to the views of the other that regulates society.310  Thus as a 
consequence of employing agonistic respect and critical responsiveness in 
order for society to self-regulate, ConnollyÕs agonism believes a hierarchy of 
regulation to be unnecessary.   
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Yet it is my belief that this regulation of society, reliant upon the 
interdependency of relations between citizens, does not suffice to surmount 
the threat of fundamentalism.  Connolly rejects fixed value hierarchies such as 
Rawls' in favour of GrayÕs contingency, contending that Ôthe dissolution of 
foundations does not automatically dissolve ethics:  it does so only for those 
who cannot be ethical without being ordered to do so.Õ311  However, surely we 
must consider that pluralist society will include those who cannot practice 
agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, and hence cannot be ethical 
without being ordered to do so.  Mark Wenman highlights two instances in 
which ConnollyÕs ethos seems Ôwoefully inadequateÕ312 with regards to such 
fundamentalists.  Firstly, he condemns Connolly suggestion that Ôwe need 
Òmerely call on the fundamentalist to acknowledge the contestability of its 
claims to intrinsic moral order and to affirm self-restrictions in the way it 
advances its agenda in the light of this admissionÓ.Õ313  Alerting us to the 
severity of such fundamentalism by turning to those who planned the 
September 11th attacks, he deems ConnollyÕs ethos to be both nave of the 
complexity of pluralist society and insufficient in mediating conflict with violent 
fundamentalists.314  Wenman challenges the likelihood that any such 
fundamentalist Ð who is prepared to indiscriminately kill those ÔinfidelÕ who do 
not share his convictions Ð would agree to either accept the contestability of 
their views, or modify themselves according to the views of others.315   
 
Wenman underlines a further threat to ConnollyÕs ethos in highlighting the 
potential for fundamentalists to refuse engagement in society altogether.  He 
asserts that Ôwe meet the zero point of ConnollyÕs theorization in his 
recognition that the invitation to Òagonistic reciprocityÓ may ultimately be 
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flatly refusedÉ  He is simply silent about what to do when the invitation to 
constructive agonism is rejected.Õ316  ConnollyÕs response to this charge 
remains optimistic, affirming that the possibility of refusal should not suffice to 
stop us from endeavouring to create such an ethos.  He states that Ôif 
circumstance dictates the necessity of such an ethosÉthen public intellectuals 
should lead the way in setting the example, rather than decrying the refusal of 
others to follow one that they have not yet instantiated sufficiently in their 
own practices.Õ317  In spite of considering such optimism to be admirable, it is 
my contention that ConnollyÕs failure to encourage fundamentalists to 
participate undermines the very goal of his theory:  to reduce fundamentalist 
conflict throughout pluralist society.  Thus, when considered within the current 
climate of terrorists and rioters, ConnollyÕs ethos alone Ôwould not be a 
sufficient political mechanism to bind a complex plurality of citizens.Õ318    
 
Perhaps in addition to questioning the efficacy of ConnollyÕs ethos with respect 
to mediation between fundamentalists, it would also be necessary to challenge 
its aspiration to include all components of society. Contrary to ConnollyÕs 
universal invitation to democratic participation, Wenman states that we need 
not tolerate those who produce extreme violence and gross inequality.319  This 
bears the subsequent question of whether we are obliged to include those who 
fail to practice the civic virtues, or whether in so doing, it Ôconcede[s] too 
much to those who might virulently oppose a radical pluralism.Õ320  It seems 
paradoxical that ConnollyÕs ethos unwaveringly seeks to protect citizens from 
the threat of oppressive, universalistic doctrines such as RawlsÕ liberal 
universalism, whilst failing to consider measures to prevent fundamentalists Ð 
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who are prepared to kill indiscriminately those who dispute their ideals Ð from 
imposing their universalism on society.   
 
In addition to my concerns of whether fundamentalists would, or indeed 
should, participate in ConnollyÕs ethos of engagement, I worry that ConnollyÕs 
ethos could fail to access other components of pluralist society.  Connolly 
states that agonism can Ôcrack the ice of fundamentalism,Õ321 by overcoming 
class inequalities through reducing social resentment.  However, Young 
rightfully highlights the potential exclusion of underprivileged sectors of 
society from accessing ConnollyÕs ethos.  She asserts that ConnollyÕs agonism 
requires the Ôrelative social privilege enjoyed by political theorists.Õ322  I share 
her anxiety over the material conditions necessary for ConnollyÕs ethos, 
wondering how, for instance, ethics of contestability and self-modification 
could access deprived, uneducated individuals.  This is evident when we 
consider those involved in the 2011 UK riots of which, disregarding the 
opportunists, there was an apparent trend of young, deprived men feeling 
Ôtrapped in the system.Õ323  It seems nave to believe that deprived individuals, 
such as the UK rioters, would be willing, or indeed able, to participate in an 
ethos that requires them to Ôcome to terms with the degree to which [their 
philosophy/faith] remains contestable on comparative terms.Õ324  When 
applied, ConnollyÕs agonism thus fails to reduce social resentment thereby 
preventing it from overcoming the marginalisation and oppression of those on 
the fringes of society.  This once again calls into question the effectiveness of 
his agonism in achieving its goal of relieving the social fragmentation and 
fundamentalist conflict present in pluralist society. 
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The gap in ConnollyÕs theory, regarding its failure to consider sufficiently the 
treatment of fundamentalists; to draw boundaries of inclusion; and to include 
underprivileged sectors of society, emerges from an institutional gap in the 
ethos.  Iris Marion Young highlights the necessity of institutions: 
 
ÔPolitical theory specifically should contribute an account of how 
institutions and political movements might construct their rules, 
policies, membership, and decision making about means and 
ends in hopes of fostering social and material conditions better 
enabling people to accept the difference in themselves and 
respect adversaries.Õ325   
 
She subsequently contends that, on the contrary, ÔConnolly offers precious few 
institutional recommendations.Õ326  Connolly defends his theory, asserting that, 
although his work encompasses tactics Ôof the self applied to the self,Õ it does 
so within the context of a democratic ethos whereby social movements 
highlight the institutions that resonate with his thinking.  He consequently 
rejects YoungÕs dismissal of his agonism as Ôtherapeutic rather than 
institutional.Õ327  Indeed, the importance of social movements to ConnollyÕs 
ethos is evident, for instance, in those movements that fought for the rights of 
women and gays.  However, I share YoungÕs concerns about the extent to 
which Connolly considers the importance of institutions to his ethos.  As 
already stated, it is my contention that ConnollyÕs theory seeks to provide 
citizens with the tools necessary for the generation of an ethos of 
engagement.  He does not aspire to give an institutionalised account of 
agonism.  Yet, I believe that the applicability of ConnollyÕs theory would be 
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greatly strengthened if it were to incorporate both public institutions and a 
motivational narrative into its ethos.   
 
Primarily then, it is vital that, whilst ConnollyÕs agonism seeks to open up 
possibilities of deliberation by reworking the fixed liberal public-private 
separation, some boundaries are still maintained between the public and the 
private.  This is imperative to preventing fundamentalism since the complete 
lack of such a boundary Ôis the symptom of a void that can endanger 
democracy, because that void provides a terrain that can be occupied by the 
extreme right to articulate new antidemocratic political identities.Õ328  Thus, in 
constructing a frontier between the public and private spheres, ConnollyÕs 
work could reduce the threat of fundamentalism.  It is essential to ensure that 
such a frontier does not allow an incontestable dominant identity (i.e. the 
fixed boundaries of liberal universalism) to impose itself onto society, and it is 
hence useful to turn to the work of Chantal Mouffe in how she attempts to 
prevent this.  She explains the necessity of redrawing the liberal public-private 
separation, whilst ensuring its contingency in order to avoid it becoming 
oppressive.  Employing the example of abortion, she demonstrates how 
conflicting conceptions of the good in pluralist society sometimes spill over 
inevitably into the public sphere of the political, and resultantly, Ôthe frontier 
between public and private is not given once and for all but constructed and 
constantly shifting.Õ329  In recognising that such a boundary will inevitably 
change alongside its shifting political context, MouffeÕs insistence on 
contingency prevents her public-private divide from being oppressive. 
 
In order to employ a public-private divide that aims to prevent 
fundamentalism, it is imperative to develop some public institutions.  It has 
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already been discussed how ConnollyÕs ethos, though beneficial to the 
relations between some citizens, is not sufficient in dealing with 
fundamentalists.  Henceforth, it is here that public institutions could enhance 
ConnollyÕs theory.  Drawing on Stuart HampshireÕs suggestion that the 
development of these institutions is not mutually exclusive with ConnollyÕs 
ethos, Martin asserts that Ôwe ought to recognise, too, the impact of public 
practices and procedures of conflict and argumentation in shaping our ethical 
dispositions towards each other.Õ330  In MartinÕs view then, which I strongly 
wish to endorse, the implementation of institutions could enrich ConnollyÕs 
agonism.  He continues, explaining that, rather than simply relying on citizens 
to Ôthink twiceÕ with respect to their relations with the other, the institutions 
themselves Ômight expose them to alternative and competing points of 
view.Õ331  David Owen advances this stance, explaining that such institutions 
would, firstly, provide Ôsubstantive concrete expression to the identity of 
citizens as rulers and ruled,Õ and, secondly, build on deliberative plurality by 
recognising pluralism throughout the decision-making procedure.332  As 
examples of the former, Owen focuses on the democratic element of 
institutions, such as participatory budgeting; citizensÕ assemblies; citizensÕ 
juries; and uses of direct democracy, to act as tools of expression for citizens.  
Meanwhile, he recommends that, in order to recognise the pluralist context in 
which decisions are made, institutions should steer away from deliberation and 
decision-making procedures that result in the polarisation of politics.333  For 
instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that Owen would endorse a 
Proportional Representation voting in order to reflect the diversity of views in 
society.  Thus in encouraging both the recognition of a plurality of views and 
the constant contestation of the dominant views, institutions could work 
                                                
330 Martin, ÔA Post-Secular Faith,Õ p. 138. 
331 Ibid, p. 139. 
332 Owen, David, ÔPluralism and the Pathos of Distance (or: How to Relax with Style): Connolly, 
Agonistic Respect and the Limits of Political TheoryÕ in British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 10(2): 2008, p. 224. 
333 Ibid, p. 224. 
 111 
alongside ConnollyÕs notions of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness in 
order to enhance its aspirations.  Owen asserts that the employment of such 
institutions would have a positive effect on ConnollyÕs theory.  He believes 
them to Ôovercome the ÒgapÓ in ConnollyÕs argument concerning the 
compatibility of an ethos of agonistic respect with democratic pluralism... 
lead[ing] to the specification of some criteria for reflecting on, and intervening 
in, political practice from issues of local activism to policy orientation to 
institutional design.Õ334  Hence, in combining ConnollyÕs ethos of generosity 
with institutional designs, it renders it applicable to democratic society.          
 
Martin asserts, however, that the development of such institutions still does 
not suffice in mediating between conflicting others.  He asserts that in order to 
Ô[transform] the tendency to nihilate others into a common aversion to our 
own silencing,Õ it is imperative that we create a narrative that provides us with 
the motivation to engage with the other.  This seems evident if we consider 
the unlikelihood of fundamentalists such as the September 11th hijackers to 
engage in ConnollyÕs ethos.  Martin demonstrates how this is depicted in 
Mouffian agonism, which draws on Carl SchmittÕs assumption that the political 
Ôis linked to the existence of an element of hostility among human beings.Õ335  
Mouffe focuses on the significance of such hostility, demonstrating how the 
antagonisms that arise from it can be used to generate competition in order to 
motivate engagement.  Martin affirms that it is this pull of antagonism that 
provokes adversaries into a shared, but contested, political space where 
differences are open to rearticulation, and one must participate in order to 
safeguard oneÕs own beliefs from the antagonism of his adversary.336  MouffeÕs 
narrative thereby shares ConnollyÕs notion of identity in which Ôevery identity 
is relational andÉthe condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation 
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of a difference.Õ337  However, in her narrative, rather than simply inviting 
citizens to practice respect toward one other and relying on their ethical 
motivations to accept (as Connolly does), adversaries are instead provoked 
into engagement with one another in which they must participate in order to 
both protect their own identity and contest that of the other.  Their 
participation ensures continual contestation, and resultantly prevents one 
identity from eradicating all others.  Hence, MouffeÕs narrative aspires to 
stimulate unity by transforming conflict between different competing identities 
into Ôthe positivity of common spaces of engagement.Õ338  Entirely compatible 
with ConnollyÕs notion of identity, such a narrative could motivate citizens into 
engaging with the other in the name of protecting their identity and contesting 
those that challenge it.  As Martin explains it, those who refuse to renounce 
their metaphysicality are likely to perceive MouffeÕs narrative more as Ôa 
provocation to adversarial conflict than a polite invitation to a dialogue that 
respects the integrity of faith.Õ  Perhaps this could fill the motivational gap that 
exists in ConnollyÕs theory with respect to fundamentalists either who refuse 
to practice agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, or who altogether 
refuse participation. 
 
Additionally, a motivational narrative such as MouffeÕs sets limits on the public 
realm by specifying that engagement between adversaries must operate 
within a certain framework of values.  Contrary to ConnollyÕs ethos, which 
refrains from employing a framework of boundaries, MouffeÕs agonism requires 
a framework of values within which contestation occurs between adversaries.  
The label ÔenemyÕ is given to Ôthose who do not accept the democratic Òrules of 
the gameÓ and who thereby exclude themselves from the political 
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community.ÕÕ339  Martin describes such a framework as setting ÔhegemonicÕ and 
Ôpost-metaphysicalÕ limits on plurality.340  The contingent limits of MouffeÕs 
agonistic framework thus overcome both the oppressiveness attributed to 
RawlsÕ liberal universalism, and the inadequacy of ConnollyÕs theory to deal 
with fundamentalists.  Mouffe avoids creating another oppressive framework 
by repeatedly insisting upon its contingency in which the framework itself is 
constantly up for contestation and re-evaluation.  Moreover, the limits placed 
by Mouffe on agonistic conflict are extremely helpful to ConnollyÕs ethos of 
generosity.  The contestable boundaries that she constructs ensure that those 
who participate in public engagement refrain from violent conflict and 
unitarianism by placing limits on those who can engage, excluding those who 
refuse to adhere to the value framework.  However her insistence on the 
necessarily contingent nature of such values - in which the framework evolves 
alongside the evolution of politics - prevents such a framework from echoing 
the oppressive element of liberal values, whilst also placing sufficient limits to 
prevent the universal imposition of a fundamentalist doctrine.   
 
It is my belief, however, that in combining ConnollyÕs ethos with both 
institutions and a motivational narrative, it should seek to avoid the clear-cut 
distinction that MouffeÕs terminology employs to distinguish between those 
who engage in the ethos, and those who are excluded.  Mouffe defines the 
ÔadversaryÕ as the other to compete with, and the ÔenemyÕ as one who, either 
refuses to operate within the framework, or who refuses entirely to engage 
with the other.341  In applying a motivational narrative, Mouffe attempts to 
transform those ÔenemiesÕ - who in all likelihood would refuse to engage in 
ConnollyÕs ethos - into ÔadversariesÕ who are willing to participate in society.  
Martin asserts that in so doing, she Ôsuccessfully distinguish[es] adversaries 
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from antagonists, disputants from outright enemies.Õ342  However, I find this 
terminology problematic in a way that parallels my resistance to liberal labels 
of ÔunreasonableÕ and Ôirrational.Õ  By using language through which the 
excluded are defined as the Ôenemy,Õ Mouffe polarises citizens, thereby 
aggravating the fragmentation of the excluded.  I share her view of the 
necessity of setting limits in order to prevent fundamentalists from imposing 
their way of life on society, however I refute the labelling of fundamentalists 
as the Ôenemy.Õ  Hence, ConnollyÕs ethos could be greatly enhanced if it were 
combined with supporting institutions and a motivational narrative such as 
MouffeÕs, but in order to avoid further exclusion and fragmentation of those 
fundamentalists who already endanger peace, we should avoid aggravating 
labels. 
 
In sum then, ConnollyÕs ethos of generosity advances post-liberal ideals of 
radical choice and contingency.  It does so, firstly, in its rejection of 
conventional pluralism whereby diversity is restricted to the status quo.  Then, 
his elimination of madness in faith through the recognition of the relationality 
and interconnectedness of identity demonstrates the need for engagement in 
society, thus rendering the public-private renegotiation a necessity.  Within 
this reworked public sphere, ConnollyÕs notions of agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness allow citizens to reduce violent conflict and promote positive 
engagement through acknowledging the contestability of oneÕs beliefs and 
modifying the self in relation to the other.  Both of these notions develop the 
notion of liberal toleration into a more ambiguous identity relationship in which 
the fluidity of identity destabilises the dominant liberal ideology.  This allows 
for the revival of democracy; more possibilities for pluralisation; and the 
overcoming of an oppressive and exclusionary hegemony.  Furthermore, 
Connolly defends his thesis against charges of cultural relativism, a critique 
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that is incompatible with his understanding of pluralism.  Instead, he sees risk 
as an inevitable component of pluralist society, in which its constant presence 
may even encourage citizens to practice agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness toward one another.  However, I believe that such an ethos is 
not sufficient in mediating between fundamentalists.  Consideration of the 
possibility (and, probability) that fundamentalists either will not practice such 
respect and responsiveness whilst engaging in the public realm or will 
altogether refuse participation signifies a lack in ConnollyÕs theory.  It appears 
to me that his self-regulating society would benefit from institutions which 
compliment the aims of his theory whilst also ensuring that the ethos is not 
threatened by fundamentalists.  Additionally, it seems that to encourage wider 
participation in the ethos, a motivational narrative could be extremely 
effective in provoking adversaries into contestation.  Such a narrative would 
also seek to provide the contingent, contestable framework of values which 
could again assist in resisting fundamentalism.  However, in combining such 
an ethos with both institutions and a motivational narrative, ConnollyÕs ethos 
should refrain from incorporating the provocative terms used by those such as 
Mouffe.  Through supplementing ConnollyÕs ethos with these elements, it is my 
contention that the narrative could provide motivation for a wider diversity of 
people to engage in public participation, and that the institutions could protect 
the ethos from fundamentalism and extremism. 
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ÔIn an age of globalization of economic relations, communications, ecological 
effects, nuclear danger, gender issues, race issues, and so on, it is imperative 
to the ethos of democracy to generate cross-national, nonstatist modes of 
political action that exceed the political boundaries of any state.Õ          
(William E. Connolly, 1995) 
   
RawlsÕ liberal universalism provides us with a commendable attempt at conflict 
mediation.  A Theory of Justice aspires to construct a political conception 
distinct from the various conflicting conceptions in society, whilst Political 
Liberalism attempts to create an overlapping consensus that is impartial 
toward divergent comprehensive doctrines.  In so doing, liberal universalism 
aims to create objective political theories that seek to both remove conflict 
from the public arena and remain impartial from conflict in the private arena.  
This constitutes an attempt at reducing conflict and mediating between diverse 
doctrines.  RawlsÕ divergence from earlier forms of liberalism comprises an 
attempt at providing a fair, equal and stable framework that neither benefits 
nor harms any particular sector of society.  However, this dissertation has 
exposed a flaw in RawlsÕ theory whereby liberal universalist claims to 
neutrality are false and its values represent one particular conception of the 
good.  Since we are unable to detach ourselves from our own assumptions, 
the Ôview from nowhereÕ approach of liberal universalism is flawed.  In 
examining liberal universalist claims to neutrality, it is evident that its 
universal authority is reliant upon a range of exclusions of minority groups; 
ethnic communities; and religions.  In upholding neutrality and universality in 
this way, liberal universalism renders itself an oppressive doctrine. It becomes  
incontestable and unchallengeable.  As a result, fundamentalist conflict may 
actually be aggravated, rather than mediated, by oppressing minority groups 
and fragmenting those sectors of society that do not adhere to liberal 
principles.  In this way, liberal universalism itself becomes a form of 
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fundamentalism.  Consequently, liberal universalism does not encourage 
diversity, but stifles it.  Diversity is suppressed by the liberal universalist 
emphasis on a fixed public-private separation in which the public sphere is 
governed by ÔneutralÕ liberal values.  As a result of aspirations toward 
neutrality, the liberal values exercised in the public sphere become void of 
substance.  Furthermore, the public-private divide is exclusionary to minority 
groups as it fails to recognise the spill over of private interests into the public 
domain.  Additionally, these exclusions are rendered oppressive by the fact 
that it is the dominant sector of society who decides where to draw the 
boundaries between the public, non-public and private spheres.  In this 
manner, liberal universalism restricts citizens from employing the individual 
freedom and toleration that it claims to grant them, once again oppressing 
and fragmenting minority groups in pluralist society and increasing the 
potential for fundamentalist conflict.  In spite of its admirable attempts at 
providing a fair, equal and stable theory, neutral toward pluralist conflict, 
there is an underlying oppressive element within liberal universalism in which 
false claims to neutrality and universality are employed to reaffirm the liberal 
hegemony and suppress diversity.   
 
Post-liberalism aims to overcome the oppression of the liberal hegemony that 
is outlined in the first chapter.  It admirably rejects the liberal universalist 
focus on neutrality and universality, asserting the impossibility of distancing 
ourselves from our attachments.  Gray illustrates the entanglement of liberal 
values by demonstrating the incompatible and incommensurable conflict that 
occurs, for example, between negative and positive liberty.  As a result, Gray 
emphasises the necessity of abandoning theories based on fixed value 
hierarchies, such as RawlsÕ liberal universalism which ranks justice as the first 
value.  Gray insists that in focusing on rationality in this way, liberal 
universalism imposes a certain way of life on all of its citizens, preventing 
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them from using circumstance and context to dictate the outcome of value 
conflict.  Instead, Gray affirms radical choice through which minorities decide 
the outcome of value conflict on a circumstantial basis, overcoming the 
oppression caused by the liberal universalist hegemony.  It follows from this 
that all decision-making should be contingent and that even if certain values 
form the current dominant norms, they are always open to contestation and 
challenge.  This ensures that post-liberalism overcomes the oppressive 
element of liberal universalism whereby its employment of neutrality and 
universality ensure the reaffirmation of its values.  However, it is my 
contention that GrayÕs theory is flawed in its failure to consider a reworking of 
the public-private divide.  The existence of a fixed division between public and 
private matters appears to be inconsistent with the view that we cannot ever 
separate ourselves from our attachments.  Surely if an anti-abortion 
campaigner must leave his attachments in the private sphere, he cannot 
exercise his radical choice when voting on abortion legislation in the political 
sphere.  Similarly, the post-liberal insistence on a more radical political 
decision-making process, which abandons the consultation of a pre-ranked set 
of values, cannot be fulfilled without a renegotiation of the fixed public-private 
divide.  Under the current public-private divide, GrayÕs work fails to overcome 
oppression because minority beliefs and assumptions are prohibited from the 
public realm and suppressed into the private sphere.  Radical choice can only 
be radical if people are encouraged to bring their conceptions of the good into 
the public sphere.  Finally, GrayÕs abandonment of universality and favouring 
of contingency is flawed as a result of the fixed public-private distinction which 
renders impossible the contestation of current dominant principles.  Hence, 
although GrayÕs work provides an admirable attempt at overcoming the 
hegemony and oppression of liberal universalism through the abandonment of 
neutrality and universality and its alternate promotion of radical choice and 
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contingency, it requires a renegotiation of the public-private distinction if it is 
to work. 
 
Agonism builds on the advances of post-liberalism with regards to overcoming 
the oppressive nature of the liberal hegemony.  It rejects the notion of 
conventional pluralism in which diversity can only operate within the status 
quo, overcoming the hegemonic nature of liberal boundaries.  In so doing, 
agonism favours the necessity of public engagement and contestation of 
beliefs and values, as opposed to the liberal universalist relegation of such 
beliefs and values to the private realm.  Connolly perceives the reworking of 
the public-private divide to be essential to his understanding of identity in 
which all are relational and necessarily interconnected.  As a result, agonism 
overcomes the oppression of the fixity of the liberal public-private sphere by 
encouraging comprehensive doctrines to enter the public sphere for 
contestation.  In outlining this agonistic public sphere, Connolly employs the 
notion of agonistic respect which seeks to problematise the power relation of 
liberal universalist toleration, in which the powerful normally grant toleration 
to the powerless.  In this way, minorities in society are reliant upon the 
dominant sectors, and must reaffirm the dominant norms if they are to be 
tolerated.  Agonistic respect transforms this relationship into a more 
ambiguous power relation whereby all identities are equally dependent on one 
another, consequently overcoming the liberal universalist oppression of 
minorities.  Critical responsiveness is also applied in ConnollyÕs agonistic public 
sphere, encouraging new possibilities of pluralism to emerge, termed 
ÔpluralizationÕ.  This allows agonism to overcome the oppression that liberal 
universalism inflicts on those outside the status quo.  Although agonism has 
rightly defended itself against charges of cultural relativism, I assert that 
ConnollyÕs theory is, however, problematic as a result of its insufficient 
institutions and motivational narrative.  By providing an ethos alone, Connolly 
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is overly optimistic about participation in the public realm, preventing it from 
overcoming the oppression of the fixed liberal public-private sphere in 
practice.  Instead, I contend that ConnollyÕs agonism would be greatly 
enhanced if it were to be supplemented by complementary institutions which 
both ensure the possibility of participation and set contestable boundaries to 
participation.  In this way, liberal universalist oppression can be overcome by 
both ensuring access to participation and preventing a decline into relativism.  
Additionally, I affirm that ConnollyÕs ethos does not suffice to motivate actors 
into engagement, rendering it unable to overcome the liberal universalist 
suppression of politics.  In order to do so, my research suggests that 
ConnollyÕs ethos is combined with a motivational narrative, such as MouffeÕs 
competing adversaries, which provokes citizens into engagement by 
encouraging them to protect their values against the contestation of one 
another.  Thus, agonism provides a noble attempt at opening up a public 
sphere of engagement and contestability in order to overcome both the liberal 
universalist oppression of minorities and suppression of diversity.  Yet, 
ConnollyÕs theory fails both in providing the institutions to support his ethos 
and in offering citizens a motivation to engage, thereby calling its ability to 
overcome oppression and suppression of diversity into question.   
 
Highlighted by international terrorism such as September 11th, pluralist value 
conflict is evidently not restricted to the domestic arena. Transnational 
movements - such as anti-abortion campaigners; pro-euthanasia activists; 
and those seeking to advance rights for homosexuals Ð illustrate the global 
dimension of value conflict whereby similar issues resound throughout the 
world.  As a result of the global dimension of value conflict, fundamentalist 
threats; social fragmentation; and violent conflict also occur on a global level.  
There is an evident need then, for an agonism that does not simply limit itself 
to mediation in the domestic realm, but also acknowledges the necessity of 
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acting globally in order to mediate pluralist conflict.  This is highly compatible 
with ConnollyÕs theory in which he perceives all identities to be relational and 
necessarily interdependent.  Globalisation consequently intensifies the 
relational and interdependent element of citizens around the world who face 
identical environmental; social; and political issues. Connolly does 
acknowledge this need for forming cross-state connections, affirming the 
global expansion of agonism to be Ôimperative to the ethos of democracy.Õ343  
Yet, his institutional deficit leaves ConnollyÕs theory vulnerable to 
fundamentalist oppression and proves his agonism to be insufficient in 
ensuring participation on a global scale.  Similarly, his failure to provide a 
motivation for engagement renders his agonism insufficient in overcoming the 
suppression of politics in the international arena.  It is thereby my contention 
that these insufficiencies constitute a serious gap within ConnollyÕs agonism, 
inhibiting it from meeting the current need for conflict mediation which 
operates beyond state boundaries.  The findings of this dissertation 
demonstrate the need to supplement ConnollyÕs agonism with both 
complimentary institutions and a motivational narrative.  These 
complementary institutions will enhance Connollian agonism by guaranteeing 
global participation and setting contingent boundaries on the framework of 
participation.  Simultaneously, the introduction of a motivational narrative will 
provoke reluctant participants into a public contestation of international 
values.  I am hopeful that consideration of these two elements will enable 
ConnollyÕs agonism to be applied on a global scale, allowing it to overcome the 
oppression of liberal universalism and revive the diversity of politics, thereby 
acting as a mediator of value conflict around the world.  My forthcoming 
doctoral research will aspire to fill this gap by exploring the specificity of the 
institutions and motivations required to enhance ConnollyÕs work, enabling it 
to become a key player in international conflict reduction.  
                                                
343 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, p. 131. 
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